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COPYRIGHT AND THE ART MUSEUM
I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introductory Example
Perhaps more than any other institution, the art museum is a daily
setting for a wide range of copyright problems. Consider the following
sequence of events: an art museum is having an exhibition of the work
of a prominent photo-realist painter.' At the same time, the museum
is considering for purchase two of the artist's works, one painted in
1970 and another painted in 1979. The exhibition will consist of works
on loan from other museums, works on loan from private collections,
and one painting from the museum's own collection. Photograpahers
hired by the museum have taken photographs of the artist at work and
several of his paintings. These will be used for promotion of the
exhibition and for didactic purposes. In a small gallery located next to
the exhibition, the museum staff has prepared an audio-visual pro-
gram about the artist, accompanied by music. The museum staff has
prepared a catalogue for the exhibition containing photographs of the
paintings, as well as critical essays contributed by several scholars,
including the museum's curator of contemporary art. In the book-
store, the museum will sell the catalogue, postcards of several paint-
ings from the exhibition, and a poster advertising the exhibition.
During the exhibition, a dance troupe from the local university will
perform a program in the museum's auditorium. It has prepared a
program of modern dance choreographed to contemporary music,
and set against a background of changing slide images of photo-realist
paintings.
1.2 Importance of Copyright in the Museum Context
This typical sequence of events, involving an exhibition of contem-
porary art, illustrates how administrators of an art museum almost
daily confront the law of copyright.
Among the many questions arising from this introductory example
are:
1. Photo-Realism, or photographic realism, is a style of painting developed inthe late 1960's.
A painting was made to resemble the impression of a sharply focused photograph, the
sharpness and precision of detail being evenly distributed over the whole with no
subordination in deference to variations of psychological interest.
The Oxford Companion to Twentieth-Century Art at 433, (H. Osborne ed. 1983). Some artists
who paint in this style include Richard Estes, Chuck Close, Don Eddy and Audrey Flack. L.
Meisel, Photo-Realism (1980).
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Are the works under purchase consideration subject to copyright
protection?2 Are they affected by the New Copyright Act which came
into effect in 1978? 3
What are the copyright implications in displaying4 the works of art
on loan from museum or private collections and reproducing 5 them in
posters, publicity materials6 and the exhibition catalogue?
Are photographs copyrightable?7 If so, who owns the copyright on
the photographs commissioned by the museum, 8 the photographers or
the museum? Similarly, who owns the copyright for the exhibition
catalogue, the museum or the contributing scholars? Would the con-
tribution by the museum's own employee present different ownership
questions?9
What formalities should the museum take in protecting its copy-
right as to affixation of notice and registration?' ° How long does the
copyright last?"
What are the copyright problems involved in performing the mod-
ern dance with its musical and visual accompaniment? 12
Obviously museum administrators need a solid understanding of
copyright law and an awareness for situations where copyright prob-
lems might arise. 13 With this article we wish to provide the museum
2. For discussion of publication and forfeiture problems under the 1909 Copyright Act [Act of
March 4, 1909, Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075] and the 1976 Copyright Act [17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1982)], see infra § 4 (notes 77-102 and accompanying text).
3. For a discussion of copyright infringement generally, see infra § 10 (notes 265-79 and
accompanying text).
4. For a discussion of exclusive rights generally, see infra § 8 (notes 167-70 and accompanying
text); for the display right in particular see infra §§ 8.12-8.13 (notes 214-20 and accompanying
text).
5. For discussion of reproduction and adaption rights, see infra §§ 8.2-8.4 (notes 171-84 and
accompanying text).
6. For discussion of fair use as a defense to infringement, see infra § 11 (notes 280-93 and
accompanying text).
7. For discussion of copyrightability, see infra §§ 2-3 (notes 24-76 and accompanying text).
8. For discussion of ownership, generally, see infra § 9 (note 221 and accompanying text).
9. For discussion of works made for hire, see infra § 9.5 (notes 240-56 and accompanying
text); for collective works, see infra § 9.6 (notes 257-59 and accompanying text).
10. For discussion of formalities generally, see infra § 5 (notes 103-28 and accompanying
text); for notice and affixation, see infra § 5.2 (notes 116-28 and accompanying text); for
registration, see infra § 5.1 (notes 103-15 and accompanying text); and for recordation, see infra
§§ 9.3-9.4, (notes 230-39 and accompanying text).
11. For discussion of duration, see infra § 6, (notes 129-41 and accompanying text); and for
discussion of renewal, see infra § 7 (notes 142-66 and accompanying text).
12. For discussion of performance right see infra §§ 8.7-8.11 (notes 195-213 and accompany-
ing text).
13. Questions concerning copyright may be of concern to others in the museum in addition
tothe director and his immediate administrative staff. These include the registrar, curators,
particularly the curator of contemporary art, the librarian, the slide librarian and the education
staff.
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administrator and the non-specialist attorney with an overview of
copyright law as it affects the museum environment. ' 4 We also wish to
show that copyright considerations in the art museum context tran-
scend the immediate concerns of acquisition and exhibition.
By our introductory example, it is apparent that from a copyright
perspective, the art museum is much more than a place which houses
and exhibits works of art.' 5 In addition to these functions, the art
museum both creates and uses copyrighted works to educate the pub-
lic about art and artists. Its staff creates copyrighted works, such as
catalogues, gallery guides, articles for museum publications,'" and
audio-visual materials.' 7 The museum also commissions outside ex-
perts to create works such as the photographs 8 and the dance pro-
gram referred to in our introductory example.
The museum is also a central location where events in the perform-
ing arts take place, sometimes to complement an exhibition, and other
times as a regular museum program.' The museum administrator
14. For an introduction to some of these problems, see S. Weil, Beauty and The Beasts: On
Museums, Art, The Law, and The Market (1983); M. Phelan, Museums and The Law, (1982)
77-91; and Ward, Copyright in Museum Collections: An Overview of Some of the Problems, 7 J.
of Coll. & U.L. 297 (1980-81).
15. For a description of the types and frequency of educational and cultural programs offered
by museums, see Museums, USA; A Survey Report (1975) [hereinafter cited as Museums, USA].
See generally The Art Museum As educator (1978); Museums, Adults and the Humanities (1981);
America's Museums: The Belmont Report (1969); and E. Alexander, Museums in Motion (1979)
at 193-229 [hereinafter cited as Museums in Motion].
16. G. Hamilton, Education and Scholarship, On Understanding Art Museums at 127-28
[hereinafter cited as Hamilton].
17. Audio-visual components of a museum exhibition can be important to establish historical
context or to include aspects of a theme which would not be suitable for normal gallery spaces,
e.g., films of dance for an art and dance exhibition. In addition, individual narration systems or
"recorded tours" may give the viewer didactic information not included in labels. Telephone
interview with Rose Glennon, Coordinator of Gallery Education, The Toledo Museum of Art,
June 25, 1983. For museum utilization of audio-visual equipment, see also Miller & Crosman, A
Cure for Videophobia, 55 Museum News at 38 (March, April, 1977) and Newman, Video Discs:
The Emerging Picture, 59 Museum News at 28 (Jan.-Feb., 1981) discussing the possible use of
video discs for archival storage and distribution of "books" of slides, in addition to gallery and
classroom.
18. Photographs are specifically included in the classification of "pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works" of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Copyright was initially extended
to artistically conceived photographs in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53
(1883). Through the years, most photographs were held to be sufficiently original to satisfy
copyright requirements. See 1 M. Nimmer on Copyright, § 2.08[E](1978) [hereinafter cited as
Nimmer].
19. A survey conducted for The National Endowment for the Arts showed that 41% of art
museums scheduled performing arts presentations on a regular or occasional basis Museums,
USA at 41. For example, during the 1981-82 season, the Metropolitan Museum of Art held 241
concerts and lectures. The Metropolitan Museum of Art Annual Report for the Year 1981-82 at
59. See also Museum Sponsorship of the Performing Arts, 53 Museum News at 24 (June 1975);
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must recognize copyright problems relating to musical, dance, 20 and
dramatic performances, both for the classroom and general public.
Today's art museum is a big business which both creates and uses
copyrighted works. It cannot ignore the legal environment of its acti-
vities. It publicizes its events2' and hires photographers and other
personnel to develop advertising materials. Many museum shops are
lucrative ventures which sell art reproductions, postcards, posters,
tee-shirts, and books. 22 What is surprising is that many museum ad-
ministrators either ignore or are unaware of certain pervasive copy-
right considerations. We direct this article to the administrators of
museums and to their non-specialist counsel as a comprehensive re-
view of the major aspects of copyright law affecting the art museum. 23
Gravesmill, Museums and The Performing Arts, 45 Museum News at 29 (Jan. 1967); National
Endowment for the Arts, Audience Studies of The Performing Arts and Museums: A Critical
Review (1978).
20. Choreographic works are specifically included in the listing of "works of authorship," 17
U.S.C. § 102(a)(1982), although no definition is included under § 101. See Traylor, Choreogra-
phy, Pantomime and the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 16 New Eng. L. Rev. 227 (1981); and
Note, Moving to a New Beat: Copyright Protection for Choreographic Works, 24 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 1287 (1977).
21. Many museums send out calendars of programs to members. These may include photo-
graphs of works of art and activphotographs from museum programs. See Cruger, Eventful
Calendars, 57 Museum News at 40 (Jan.-Feb., 1979). Both the text and the photographs are
copyrightable subject matter. See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
22. For example, in 1982, gross revenues from merchandise operations for The Metropolitan
Museum of Art amounted to $22,578,788. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Annual Report for
the Year 1981-82 at 70. Revenues for the same period from the sales shop of the Philadelphia
Museum were $665,601. Philadelphia Museum of Art, 106th Annual Report 1981-82 at 43. For
the Dallas Museum of Fine Arts, revenues from the museum shop were $420,806. Dallas
Museum of Fine Arts, Report for the Fiscal Year October 1, 1981-September 30, 1982. See also
Taylor, The Art Museum in the United States in On Understanding Art Museums at 48-9; and
Trucco, The Shopping Boom at Your Local Museum, 76 Art News 56, (October 1977). The
Museum Store Association, an organization of approximately 600 members, publishes a journal,
MUST, devoted to issues of interest to museum stores. One concern, particularly with the
expansion of the types of merchandise carried in these stores, has been the maintenance of tax
exempt status. Museum stores sales must be related to the tax exempt purpose of the institution,
$501(c)(3) IRC. See Gilbert, Coming to Terms With the Tax Man, 61 Museum News at 18
(Sept.-Oct. 1982); and Liles and Roth, The Unrelated Business Income Problems of Art Muse-
ums, 10 Conn. L. Rev. 638 (1978).
23. For the non-specialist lawyer who may be unfamiliar with copyright law, the leading
source is a four-volume treatise, Nimmer on Copyright. Shorter, but useful works are N.
Boorstyn, Copyright Law (1981) [hereinafter cited as Boorstyn]; A. Latman, The Copyright
Law: Howell's Copyright Law Revised and the 1976 Act, (5th ed. 1978), [hereinafter cited as
Latman]; and W. Strong, The Copyright Book (1981) [hereinafter cited as Strong]. For a focus
on copyright law and fine arts, see T. Crawford, The Visual Artist's Guide to the New Copyright
Law (1978); Millinger, Copyright and The Fine Artist, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 354 (1980);
Brenner, A Two-Phase Approach to Copyrighting the Fine Arts, 24 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 85
(1976); and Gottlieb, Pictorial, Graphic and Sculptural Works Under the New Copyright Act in
Current Developments in Copyright Law at 415 (1980).
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2. WHAT Is COPYRIGHT?
Copyright law creates a system of property rights for the protection
of art, literature, and music. Unlike other kinds of property, land or
objects,a copyright occupies no physical space; it is an intangible
propertyright conferred on certain kinds of expressive information
called works of authorship. 24 Although a copyright is essentially intan-
gible, it springs into existence when an author, e.g., an artist, a
composer, a choreographer, embodies the work of authorship in a
relatively permanent form. In the language of the current Copyright
Act, "copyright subsists in original works of authorship fixed in a
tangible medium of expression .. 25 We will now discuss the mean-
ing of these key requirements for copyrightability: fixation and tangi-
ble medium of expression. We will later turn to the question of
originality and authorship.
26
2.1 Fixation
From the above definition, copyright protection begins when an
author has fixed his work27 in a tangible medium of expression. A
copyright is not granted by the government, as is a patent,28 but comes
into being when an author places his artistic expression in a material
object. The object could be a piece of paper, a canvas, a tape, or a
block of marble. This concept is one of the most misunderstood of
copyright law because many believe that a copyright protection be-
gins when the Copyright Office registers the work. Although there are
many excellent reasons for registering a claim for copyright in the
24. Works of authorship include the following:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). The introductory example includes a variety of works of authorship,
e.g., the exhibition catalogue (literary work), the musical accompaniments for audio-visual
program and dance (musical work), the modern dance (choreographic work), the paintings,
photographs, postcards and posters (pictorial works), the audio-visual program (audio-visual
works), the recordings of the music (sound recording). This statutory listing is not exhaustive and
Congress has the power to include, by legislation, new types of works of authorship. H.R. Rep.
No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1976) at 51, [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep.].
25. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
26. See infra notes 49-76 and accompanying text.
27. For stylistic convenience, words of the masculine gender are intended to include the
feminine.
28. 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
1984]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ART AND THE LAW [Vol. 8:249
Copyright Office, it 29 is the act of the author placing his work in a
tangible medium of expression, rather than the act of registration,
which creates the copyright.
What constitutes a tangible medium of expression? In the language
of the Copyright Act, there are two basic varieties of objects in which
works are embodied: copies30 and phonorecords.31 Phonorecords en-
compass tapes, discs or similar objects in which sound is recorded,
whereas the term "copy" 32 defines a residue category which includes
all things, other than phonorecords, in which works are placed. For
example, a work of music may be embodied on a phonorecord in tape
or disc form or in a copy by notation on a sheet of paper. Whether an
object is called a copy or a phonorecord is of little importance. Whatis important is that one must conceptually distinguish the material
object from the work of authorship, that is, the copyright.
When one refers to "media of expression," what most often comes to
mind are books, tapes, canvasses and the like. As with the develop-
ment of sound recording in the early twentieth century, technological
advances often produce new forms of expression. The current Copy-
right Act takes into account those yet to be discovered media of
expression.3 3 A newly discovered medium will qualify as copy or
phonorecord as long as it meets the requirement of tangibility.
29. See infra notes 103-115 and accompanying text.
30.
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by
any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. The term "copies" includes the material object, other than a
phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
31.
"Phonorecords" are material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying
a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
"phonorecords" includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
32. Argues Nimmer,
An unnecessary complexity in a necessarily complex statute could have been avoidedby defining copies to include all material objects in which works of authorship arefixed, regardless of whether or not the work itself consists of sound.
1 Nimmer, § 2.03[C] at 2-32.
33.
Copyright protection subsists. . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed . . ..17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (emphasis added). As the House Report states,
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As stated above, a copyrighted work must be tangible as well as
fixed. 34 To meet the requirement of tangibility, the artist must render
his work in a sufficiently permanent and stable form. There are many
works which involve great creativity, such as a sand sculpture, a fence
running along the countryside, 35 a window display in a store, or a
stage set, but which do not exist in a relatively permanent form. None
of these works would meet the tangibility requirement.36 Similarly, a
museum curator's installation of an exhibition may entail great plan-
ning and imagination, 37 and, as with the other examples, be the
subject of written commentary; 38 but, because there is no stable em-
bodiment of a work of authorship, it is not subject to copyright
protection.
2.2 Material Object and Copyright
As stated, one must conceptually separate ownership of the material
object and ownership of the copyright. The copyrighted work may be
Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is impossible
to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take. The bill does not
intend . . . to freeze the scope of copyrightable technology.
H.R. Report at 51.
34. See supra note 33. Works that are not fixed in a tangible medium of expression are left to
protection under state common law copyright. Even though state law is a possible form of
protection, it is an inadequate substitute for protection under federal law. Rights in an unfixed
work are much more difficult to protect because their very nature and existence are difficult to
prove. Further, state courts vary in their attitudes toward their own copyright laws and the
outcome of a suit based on state common law principles is difficult to predict. See Dunlap,
Copyright Protection for Oral Works-Expansion of the Copyright Law into the Area of
Conversations, 20 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 285 (1973).
35. Perhaps the best known sculptor of "temporary monuments" is Christo, the originator of
packaging art, who has wrapped cars, buildings and islands, in addition to sections of coastline.
See Alloway, Christo (1969); Christo: Oceanfront (1975).
36. For arguments that displays and environmental works of art, such as Christo's "Running
Fence," fulfill the constitutional and statutory requirements of copyright, see Note, Copyright
Protection for Short-Lived Works of Art, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 90 (1982).
37. Installation of an exhibition, either a temporary one or one that is more permanent, may
involve extensive work, including selection of objects, planning the layout and arranging the
objects, lighting, label preparation, and the development of audio-visual and other didactic
materials. The ultimate goal may be to "provide fresh ways of looking at objects that enhance
their impact and meaning." Museums in Motion at 182. For the extensive amount of work which
exhibition installation design can entail see, e.g., Ciulla and Montgomery, Creative Compro-
mise: The Curator and the Designer, 55 Museum News 31 (March-April 1977).
38. For criticism of otherwise widely praised installation of American Art at Yale University
Art Gallery, where, for example, chairs were hung from walls, where they could be seen as
objects, rather than as pieces of furniture: "A wall of chairs can be a thing of beauty in itself. ..
but chairs were meant to be sat on, and were designed to be seen from different angles than high
on a wall." Hamilton, supra note 4, at 122. The installation of the photo-realist exhibition's
overall design and layout is not copyrightable, the photographs and didactic labels used as part
of the installation are copyrightable works of authorship.
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a literary work printed on pages of a book, pigment painted on a
canvas, or a musical work pressed into the grooves of a phonorecord.
Books, canvasses and phonorecords are sold to the public, but their
acquisition does not confer ownership of the copyright in a literary,
artistic, or musical work. 39
A misunderstanding of this basic principle can lead to unfortunate
results for the art museum. Even if the museum owns a painting,
bought at great expense, it does not hold the copyright on the painting
unless it is specifically transferred by the artist. 40 The museum may
believe erroneously that ownership of the object includes ownership of
the copyright and therefore the right to reproduce the work on a
poster or postcard for sale in the museum shop. Many museums make
this error because of a fundamental misunderstanding of the intangi-
ble nature of copyright, by failing to separate conceptually ownership
of the copyright from ownership of the material object. Perhaps they
make this mistake because many works of art are unique and valu-
able. But the museum, absent a specific grant, no more owns the
copyright on the painting that if it were to acquire the copyright in a
literary work by buying a paperback book at a bookstore.
Returning to the introductory example, concerning the acquisition
of the two paintings, the museum should consider acquiring both the
paintings and their copyrights. Most often, the artist will have no
object to transferring the canvas and its copyright, but as artists
become more sensitive to copyright, the two aspects of ownership,
material object and copyright, may become the subject of separate
negotiation.
39.
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in
which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted
work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of
ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey property
rights in any material object.
17 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
40.
. . . copyright ownership and ownership of a material object in which the copyrighted
work is embodied are entirely separate things. Thus, transfer of a material object does
not of itself carry any rights under copyright, and this includes transfer of the copy or
phonorecord . . . the photographic negative, the unique painting or statue . . . in
which the work was first fixed.
H.R. Report at 124. For a discussion of the change this requirement of specific transfer had made
in the common law, see infra, notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8:249
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2.3 Idea and Expression
An owner of a copyright owns certain rights to an intangible intel-
lectual creation, but not all creations of the mind enjoy copyright
protection. One such major limitation is that copyright does not pro-
tect ideas, only the expression of ideas. 4' This is one of the must elusive
concepts in copyright law, but one which affects all aspects of copy-
rightable subject matter. Once public, an idea becomes public prop-
erty free for anyone to use. It makes no difference how intricate,
clever, or beneficial the idea may be. Examples are systems of book-
keeping, 42 abstract outlines of fictional plots43 and historical discov-
41.
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discov-
ery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
42. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court,
which held that a system of bookkeeping, illustrated by ruled lines and blank columns was not
copyrightable. While the expression of the idea was copyrightable, e.g., the book, the underlying
idea, e.g., the bookkeeping system, was not. See 1 Nimmer, § 2.18[B], [C], for a discussion of the
Baker v. Selden doctrine; and 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(b), (c) (1982), for a codification of these
principles. Where the expression of an idea is limited in form, it has been held not to be
copyrightable. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967),
denying copyright protection to sweepstake contest rules.
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that the topic necessarily
requires . . . , if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to
permit copyrighting would mean that a party . . . could exhaust all possibilities of
future use of the substance.
See also Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943) (chart for
recording temperatures held not copyrightable); and Aldrich v. Remington Rand, 152 F. Supp.
732 (N.D. Tex. 1942) (forms for keeping tax records held not copyrightable). But, cf., Harcourt,
Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding that
printed answer sheets, created for use in conjunction with student achievement and intelligence
tests and designed to be graded mechanically were copyrightable); and Continental Casualty
Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958) (blanket bond forms held copyrightable).
43. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), in which the
author of the play, "Abie's Irish Rose," sued the producer of the movie, "The Cohens and the
Kellys." Both were comedies dealing with religious intermarriage. Judge Learned Hand held for
the defendant on the grounds that the theme of the play fell in the realm of unprotected "ideas."
See also cases cited in Latman, supra note 23, at 32; and Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting
Co., 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the television comedy, "The Greatest American
Hero" did not infringe the copyright in cartoon strips and movies of "Superman" because the
theme of a character with superhuman powers who battles the forces of evil is not copyrightable
although the expression of such an idea could be). For an excellent discussion of the protection of
literary dramatic characters, see Authors League Symposium on Copyright, 29 J. of Copyright
Soc'y 611 (1982).
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eries of fact. 4 4 Similarly, one might devise an elaborate theory of art, 45
discover a new work by an Old Master, 46 or devise an ingenious
method for installing an exhibition. These intellectual creations
would, however, be considered as belonging to the realm of ideas and
therefore unprotectable under copyright law. There is a limited basis
for protecting an idea under state law by privately disclosing it under
circumstances which expressly or through implication indicate confi-
dentiality. 47 But such contractual protection of an idea only extends to
the parties subject to the disclosure and not to third parties who find
out about it some other way. 48
44. While historical facts themselves, even newly discovered ones, may not be entitled to
copyright, it may be argued that their selection and arrangement in a particular work provides
sufficient originality to warrant protection. This problem displays the inherent tension in copy-
right law between the underlying and competing policies of protecting the interests of an author
who may have spent great time and effort on his product, and the benefit to the public in the
wide dissemination of facts. See generally Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and
Representation of Facts, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1569 (1963); Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implica-
tions for Copyright, 29 J. of Copyright Soc'y 560 (1982); and Denicola, Copyright in Collections
of Facts: A Theory for The Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 516(1981). The question ofthe copyrightability of research often arises when a second work, e.g., a
television movie, is based upon facts uncovered in an earlier work. See, e.g., Rosemont Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009
(1967) (the life story of Howard Hughes); Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365 (1981)(kidnapped victim who was buried alive); and Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972(2d Cir. 1980) (the destruction of the Hindenberg). This decision is extensively criticized in
Guinsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A Comment on the Scope of Copyright
Protection in Works of History after Hoehling v. Universal Studios, 29 J. Copyright Soc'y 647(1982). Holding that these works are collections of facts, rather than the expression of ideas,
copyright protection has been denied to maps, Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 189
F.2d 104 (1951); Moore v. Lighthouse Pub. Co., 429 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Ga. 1977); and
directories, New York Times Co. v. Roxburg Data Interface, 434 F. Supp. 217 (D.N.J. 1977),
but cf., Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977) (gardening directory
held copyrightable when made by substantial independent effort and selection).
45. See, e.g., A. Breton, What Is Surrealism (1934), reprinted in Theories of Modern Art(1968), at 402-27. Breton's concepts of the origins of surrealism would not have been copyright-
able and would therefore be freely appropriable by other writers. Of course, the actual expres-
sion of his ideas could be protected under copyright.
46. E.g., in 1954, a ceiling sketch, "Allegory of The Planets and Continents," by Giovanni
Battista Tiepolo (1696-1770) was discovered in the Hendon Hall Hotel in London. E. Fahy,
Paints, Drawing in The Wrightsman Collection, The Metropolitan Museum of Art at 239-40
(1973).
47. See, e.g., Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956) (writer alleged express
promise by movie producer to pay for story if used). The California Supreme Court stated, "The
person who can and does convey a valuable idea to a producer who commercially solicits the
service or who voluntarily accepts it knowing that it is tendered for a price should likewise be
entitled to recover." Id. at 734, 299 P.2d at 267. See also Davies v. Krasna, 245 Cal. App. 2d
535, 54 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1966); Donahue v. Ziv Television Programs, 245 Cal. App. 2d 593, 54
Cal. Rptr. 130 (1966); and Minniear v. Tors, 266 Cal. App. 2d 495, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968).
48. For extensive discussion of protection under state law, see 3 Nimmer, § 16.03.
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3. COPYRIGHTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
3.1 Originality and Authorship
The Copyright Act confers protection on original works of author-
ship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. We have already dis-
cussed the concept of fixation, tangibility and the medium of expres-
sion. We now turn to the question of what is an original work of
authorship.
The copyright law sets forth broad categories of works of author-
ship which include literary works, drama, pure and applied art,
audio-visual works and sound recordings. 49 The art museum in one
way or another might make use of the entire range of this subject
matter. Our purpose in this section, though, is not to discuss the
intricacies of the various forms of copyrightable subject matter, but
rather to focus on the concepts of "originality" and "authorship"
which concern all categories of copyrightable works, whether a liter-
ary work, audio-visual, or pictorial work.
50
Originality and authorship are concepts whose meanings have de-
veloped through the years by their construction in courts of law. 5'
Generally, an original work of authorship is one which owes its origin
to an author, while demonstrating at least a minimal amount of
creativity. 52 The original work of authorship need not be novel, as
long as the author's work is independently created. Thus, it is entirely
possible that copyright protection could be enjoyed by two identical
works if the second author had not copied from the first.
53
The other aspect of originality, that of minimal creativity, em-
bodies no conception of artistic merit. Very early in the century an
oft-cited Supreme Court case established the above proposition. 54 This
case, which concerned the copyrightability of a circus poster, explic-
itly established that courts should not inject their view on what consti-
tutes artistic merit when deciding questions of copyrightability.
55
49. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
50. For an analysis of the requirement of "originality" as applies to the visual arts, see
Oppenheimer, Originality in Art Productions, 26 J. of Copyright Soc'y 1 (1978).
51. See H.R. Report at 51.
52. See infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
53. See infra note 268 and accompanying text.
54. Bleistein v. Donaldson, 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
55.
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to
miss appreciation .... At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which
appealed to a public less educated than the judge.
Id. at 251-52.
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Since that time, both the courts and Copyright Office have uniformly
refused to exercise their conception of artistic quality in determining
questions of originality.5"
56. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951)
("No matter how poor artistically the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his own.") This
constraint is incorporated into the new copyright law. According to the House Report,
[t]he phrase, "original works of authorship," which is purposely left undefined, is
intended to incorporate without change "the standards of originality" established by
the courts under the present copyright statute. This standard does not include require-
ments of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the
standard of copyright protection to require them ....
H.R. Rep. at 51.
Considerations of creativity and originality aside, a troublesome question through the years
has been the availability of copyright protection under the classification "work of art" for works
of applied art, as compared to works of fine art. This is particularly difficult when the object
combines both "utilitarian" and "artistic" features, because utilitarian articles fall outside copy-
right protection. In the leading case of Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) the Supreme Court
held that the statuette of a dancing figure which constituted the base of a lamp constituted a
"work of art." However, in 1978, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d
796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979), refused copyright protection as "works
of art" to outdoor lighting fixtures. The Court held that the overall shape of a utilitarian object is
not copyrightable and distinguished Mazer on the grounds that the dancing figures were capable
of existing as a work of art independent of the utilitarian article in which they were incorpo-
rated.
Although the original Senate version (S. 22) of the 1976 Copyright Act contained a provision
for copyright of design, this was deleted in the final version of the bill. However, the 1976 Act
did add language to the definition of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works," stating:
Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as
defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only
if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural features that can be identified separately from and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). See also, H.R. Report at 54-55. The distinction between works of
utilitarian design and works of art was further confused by the decision in Kieselstein-Cord v.
Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) granting copyright protection to two belt
buckle designs. The court, referring to the concept that "separability" may occur either physi-
cally or conceptually held that "[t]he primary ornamental aspect of the... buckles is conceptu-
ally separable from their subsidiary utilitarian function" at 993. In sum, in spite of Bleistein's
pronouncement that courts of law should not discriminate against various art forms, industrial
design which is precluded from protection is a notable exception. Although industrial design at
this time appears in large part outside the realm of copyright, design patent is an alternate form
of protection. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1982). Obtaining design patent protection, however, is both
time-consuming and expensive and application is subject to intense scrutiny by the Patent office
as to meeting the rigorous standards of patentibiity, novelty and non-obviousness. Draft, Second
Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on The General Rivision of the U.S.
Copyright Law, Chapter VII (1975). Therefore, a museum such as the Museum of Modern Art,
which collects works of contemporary design, must be aware of possible copyright and patent
implications. For recent articles in this area see generally Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial
Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 707 (1983);
Paul, Functional Works of Art: Copyright, Design Patent, or Both?, 3 Comm/Ent. L.J. 83
(1980); and Note, Works of Applied Art: An Expansion of Copyright Protection, 56 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 241 (1982).
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Although the quality of art is not an issue in determining co-
pyrightability, a certain quantum of originality, or creative author-
ship, is required.5 7 This is largely a de minimis standard and easy to
meet, but copyright has been denied to fragmentary words or
phrases,5 8 slogans,5 9 slight variations of musical compositions, 0 and a
paraphrase of standard business forms.6' On the other hand, almost
any trivial variation will satisfy the standard for crerativity. Thus
courts have found originality in such banal creations as the label on a
box of cake62 and plastic flowers.
6 3
3.2 Originality and Derivative Works:
Reproductions of Works of Art
Much artistic work is consciously based on one or more preexisting
works. Examples are art reproductions, 64 musical arrangements,
57.
Copyright protection subsists ...in original works of authorship....
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
In order to be acceptable as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, the work must
embody some creative authorship in its delineation or form.
37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1982).
58. E.g., Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding
that the phrase "most personal sort of deodorant" is not copyrightable.) See also 37 C.F.R. §
202.1 (1982), in which, under "Materials not subject to copyright," "words and short phrases
such as names, titles and slogans" are included. A new "label" for a school of painting, for
example, such as "minimalism" or "photo-realism" would not be entitled to copyright protec-
tion. But see, 1 Nimmer, § 2.01[B] at 2-15, for arguments that even a short phrase, if sufficiently
creative, might be entitled to copyright protection.
59. Slogans can be protected under certain circumstances under the law of unfair competi-
tion. See generally, McCarthy, Trademarks and the Law of Unfair Competition (1973) at § 7.5.
60. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill.
1950); and McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 179 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Cal. 1959). But cf.
Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1956) (holding that composition based on folk song was
copyrightable.)
61. See, e.g., Donald v. Zack Meyers' T.V. Sales and Service, 426 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971) (holding that the olaintiff's legal form was not entitled
to protection, the court stated, "We reward creativity and originality with a copyright but we do
not accord copyright protection to a mere copycat.")
62. See, e.g., Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.
1957) (The pictures of the cakes used by plaintiff on its labels although possibly not achieving the
quality of a Leonardo "Still Life" nevertheless have sufficient commercial artistry to entitle them
to protection against obvious copying....") But cf. Bailie v. Fisher, 258 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (holding that a standing cardboard star does not fall within the historical and ordinary
conception of a work of art.)
63. See, e.g., Prestige Floral v. California Artificial Flower Co., 201 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y.
1962). But cf. Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (holding that plaintiff's artificial corsages lacked the creativity and originality necessary for
a work of art under the Copyright Act.)
64. Art reproductions are specifically included in the definition of "pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works." See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Note that the registrability of a work of art is not
affected by the number of copies reproduced, 37 CFR § 202.10(a) (1982).
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dramatizations, and abridgments which either embody or recast these
preexisting or underlying works in some way. This kind of work,
known as a derivative work,65 is a protectible work under copyright,
but is protectible only as to the new authorship added to the preexist-
ing work. 6 The creator of a derivative work cannot claim copyright
in the underlying work, and if the underlying work is subject to
copyright protection, the derivative work author must obtain consent
to create the derivative work or copyright will be infringed. 17
Both the concepts of originality and derivative work authorship are
important to the art museum, particularly for art reproductions such
as may be used for posters, postcards, photographic slides, and sculp-
ture.6 8 These uses of copyrighted works constitute a major source of
income for both the museum and the artist. One can only sell, rent or
reproduce a work of art and it is this latter function which can earn
steady income for the artist and the museum.
Who owns the copyright, if any, in reproduction of a work of art?
Because a reproduction of a work of art is basically a derivative work,
the museum as a reproducer must obtain the consent of the copyright
owner to reproduce the work and create a non-infringing derivative
work. As in any work, the museum as copyright claimant must add an
original contribution not found in the preexisting work.
65.
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture ver-
sion, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form
in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See generally Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in
Copyright, 30 J. of Copyright Soc'y 209 (1983).
66.
The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and
derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which
copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has
been used unlawfully.
17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1982).
67.
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material
employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge
the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the
preexisting material.
17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982).
68. For an interesting argument that restorations of works of art should qualify as derivative
works for copyright protection, see Mandel, Copyrighting Art Restorations, 28 J. of Copyright
Soc'y. 273 (1981).
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The general de minimis standard of originality applies to an art
reproduction as to any other work. The author need only add some-
thing irreducibly his own, but no more than a trivial variation on the
preexisting work. For example, engravings of public domain paint-
ings,69 as well as three-dimensional scale-model reproductions have
been held copyrightable. 70 Although there appears to be some discrep-
ancy in how far the courts will go in conferring copyright on art
reproductions, 71 the historical tendency has been expansive. For this
reason, the museum should always claim copyright in any reproduc-
69. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951)
(holding that mezzotint engravings of "old master" paintings, for example, Gainsborough's "Blue
Boy" were copyrightable as they were "versions" of the paintings, distinguishable from them,
and the mezzotint process involved originality (i.e., skill and judgment) on the part of the
engraver. Lithographic reproductions of these mezzotints, therefore, constituted enfringement of
copyright).
70. See, Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The work
involved was a small scale reproduction of Rodin's "Hand of God," (which was in the public
domain), produced by Alva in arrangement with the Department of Fine Arts of The Carnegie
Institute, owner of the Rodin sculpture. The court held that Alva's reproduction was copyright-
able as its work "embodies and resulted from its skill and originality in producing an accurate
scale of reproduction of the original." Id. at 267. The court emphasized the difference in size
between the original sculpture and the Alva model, the different treatment of the base of the
sculpture and the quality control exercised by the museum's curatorial staff.
71. See, L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976), a case involving plastic
replicas of antique iron "Uncle Same" banks. The court held that the copyright statute's require-
ment of originality was not met as the variations were merely trivial. It distinguished Alva as
dealing with the reproduction involving complexity and exactitude not present in this case. The
Batlin decision was relied upon by the court in Gracen v. Bradford Exch. 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir.
1983), deciding inter alia the copyrightability of paintings and drawings made of Wizard of Oz
characters and based on stills from the movie. The court held that the plaintiff's work was not an
original derivative work. ". . . a derivative work must be substantially different from the
underlying work to be copyrightable." 698 F.2d at 305. As the court poined out, the concept of
originality serves an important legal function to prevent overlapping claims.
Suppose Artist A produces a reproduction of the Mona Lisa, a painting in the public
domain, which differs slightly from the original. B also make a reproduction of the
Mona Lisa. A, who has copyrighted his derivative work, sues B for infringement. B's
defense is that he was copying the original, not A's reproduction. But if the difference
between the original and A's reproduction is slight, the difference between A's and B's
reproductions will also be slight, so that if B had access to A's reproductions, the trier
of fact will be hard-pressed to decide whether B was copying A or copying the Mona
Lisa itself. 698 F.2d at 304.
Cf. Eden Toys v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982), holding that gift wrap
design based on sketches of Paddington Bear was copyrightable because the "cleaner look" of the
gift wrap design satisfied the minimal requirements for originality under the Copyright Act.
The courts have clearly been inconsistent in their treatment of art reproductions. This incon-
sistency will continue into the foreseeable future because of the basic dilemma between protect-
ing "sweat of the brow" but at the same time requiring de minimis level of creativity. The extent
of the variations in Alva and Batlin was similar, but the expertise and the amount of effort
expended by the reproducer was strikingly different. Once again, the court has smuggled in
concepts of artistic quality despite the stated goals of Bleistein to the contrary.
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tion that appears in a poster, postcard, advertisement, brochure, or
three-dimensional model .72
Museums make art reproductions of both public domain works and
works which are protected by copyright. In each instance the museum
has created a derivative work and can protect only what it has added
either to the public domain work or to the copyrighted work. This can
result in a rather thin copyright, depending upon how much the
museum has added. As for the public domain work, anyone can make
his own reproduction of it. For example, if the museum reproduces El
Greco's "View of Toledo," a work in the public domain, anyone else
could reproduce the same painting. What he could not do is copy the
museum's reproduction of that work, because this would necessarily
entail copying the original aspects of authorship contributed by the
museum.7 3 To quote Justice Holmes, "Others are free to copy the
original. They are not free to copy the copy. 74
Suppose the museum has reproduced a work currently protected by
copyright. The same principles of originality apply here, except that
the museum can claim copyright only in those original aspects added
by the reproduction. Of course, the museum, to avoid being an in-
fringer, must obtain consent of the copyright owner to make the
reproduction. 75 Note that even after the museum has created the
reproduction, the artist could allow others to make their own repro-
ductions, although no one could copy the museum's reproduction
72. This reproduction could take the form of a photograph. A close question, however, is
whether a photograph of a painting displays sufficient originality to qualify for copyright.
According to Nimmer, a photograph of a two-dimensional object, for example, a painting or
drawing, may lack this quantum of originality; however, such a work may claim copyright as a
reproduction of a work of art. 1 Nimmer, § 2.08[E] at 2-111. Alternatively, a photograph of a
sculpture or other three-dimensional object, which involves the photographer's judgment in
selecting camera angles and lighting, is a clearer case of sufficient original authorship. For cases
involving originality in photographs, see Gross v. Seligman, 21 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914) (where
photographer, after sale of photograph and copyright, took later picture with same model and
pose but with addition of a smile on her mouth and a cherry in her teeth, held an infringement);
and the related case of Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat'l Wildlife Art Exch., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.
1978) (holding that later painting by artist of same subject not infringement, as similarity
reflected the common theme).
73. If, for example, the museum produced a postcard of one of its paintings which was in the
public domain and copyrighted the card, a jigsaw puzzle manufacturer could not base a puzzle
on the postcard, even if the original painting could be copied. See, e.g., Habersham Plantation
Corp. v. Country Concepts, 209 U.S.P.Q. 711 (N.D. Ga. 1980), granting injunction for alleged
copyright infringement of photographs of furniture in a catalogue. The furniture itself could be
copied, the photographs could not. This case illustrates that copying in a different medium
(Country Concepts' catalogue contained lined drawings based on Habersham's photographs) also
constitutes infringement. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
74. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. at 249.
75. See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
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without its consent. As a corollary, when the underlying work falls
into the public domain, the whole world may copy it. The museum's
copyright in its reproduction, however, will not be affected by the
underlying work falling into the public domain, and its copyright in
its derivative work will continue for the full duration.
76
4. PUBLICATION
4.1 Importance of Publication
For works created after January 1, 1978, federal copyright protec-
tion begins on creation, when an author fixes his work in a tangible
medium of expression. 77 Works created before this critical date
present a more complicated situation. For these works the duration of
the copyright is still measured by the 1909 Act, 78 certain terms of
which are essential for a thorough grasp of copyright law.
Unlike the current Act, the 1909 Act measured federal protection
not on creation but on publication.79 The event of publication consti-
tuted the dividing line between state common law protection and
federal copyright. Publication also determined how long a particular
work could endure. As long as the work was not published, it could
theoretically endure forever under state common law copyright.8 0
The 1976 Act has greatly reduced the fundamental importance of
publication by extending federal protection from the moment of crea-
tion. "' But publication and the provisions of the 1909 Act continue to
76. See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
77.
A work is "created when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time; where a
work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any
particular time constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work has been
prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate work.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
78. Act of March 4, 1909, Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1909) (Superseded 1976).
80. Under the theory of state common-law copyright, unpublished works, for example, the
manuscript of a book, came under perpetual copyright protection. See generally Brown, Unifica-
tion: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1070 (1977).
81. Section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act provided a major change from the earlier law.
Instead of a dual system of "common law copyright" for unpublished works and
statutory copyright for published works. . . .the bill adopts a single system of Federal
statutory copyright from creation .... By substituting a single Federal system for the
present anachronistic, uncertain, impractical, and highly complicated dual system,
the bill would greatly improve the operation of the copyright law and would be much
more effective in carrying out the basic constitutional aims of uniformity and the
promotion of writing and scholarship.
H.R. Report at 129. For major arguments in favor of a single system. see H.R. Report at 129-30.
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be important.8 2 This is because the new Act does not protect any work
which has gone into the public domain before January 1, 1978.83
Before the effective date of the new Act, an author had to affix proper
notice to all copies of the work when published. Failure to affix proper
notice would inject the work into the public domain.8 4 This aspect of
copyright has proven to be an insidious trap for the unwary, and
many an author has dedicated his work to the public domain without
wishing to do so. 8 5 For example, if an artist had distributed copies of
his painting by photograph to the public without proper copyright
notice before January 1, 1978, the work would enter the public do-
main forever and nothing could be done to revive the work to copy-
right status once it had entered the public domain. Thus, the mu-
seum, in acquiring the copyright to a work created before January 1,
1978, must be concerned about its publication history in order to
determine if the copyright is valid. Alternatively, a museum may be
interested in using a particular work, as for example, to reproduce it
as a postcard or in a poster. If the artist has published his work
without proper notice, the museum as well as the public can make use
of the work any way it wishes.
What constitutes publication? 6 Paradoxically, this enormously im-
portant concept is not defined under the 1909 Act. Publication doc-
trine has developed rather inconsistently through case law. 7 The 1976
Act has attempted to codify this decisional law, defining publication
as:
the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership or rental, lease, or lending. The
82. For example, copyright notice must include the year of first publication (§ 402(b)(2)); the
term of copyright for anonymous and pseudonymous works and works made for hire is measured
from the year of first publication (§ 302(c)); registration in the Copyright Office must occur
within five years of first publication in order for the registration certificate to constitute prima
Jacie evidence of the validity of the copyright (§ 410(c)). For a comprehensive listing of the
instances where publication continues to be important, see 1 Nimmer, § 4.01[A] and Latman at
143-44.
83.
This Act . . . does not provide copyright protection for any work that goes into the
public domain before January 1, 1978 ....
17 U.S.C. Note prec. § 101 (1982).
84. See, e.g., Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 320 F.
Supp. 1303 (N.D. 11. 1970) (maquette of Picasso sculpture displayed to public without copyright
notice affixed resulted in loss of protection for the sculpture.)
85. For example, the failure of the artist Robert Indiana to copyright his widely adapted
"Love." The Visual Artist and Law, (Rev. Ed. 1974).
86. Note that the term "publication" in copyright law is a legal one, as distinct from the every
day usage of the word.
87. See discussion in 1 Nimmer, § 4.04, and Strauss, Protection of Unpublished Works, in 1
Studies on Copyright 189 (Arthur Fisher Mem. Ed. 1963).
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offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons
for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public
display constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a
work does not of itself constitute publication.18
The above definition does not involve any question of subjective intent
on the artist's part. Thus, publication may occur even if the copyright
owner does not realize as matter of law that the acts he is committing
or consenting to constitute publication. In sum, as long as the copy-
right owner voluntarily sells, leases, loans or gives away the original
or tangible copies of the work to the general public, publication
occurs. Further, even if a sale or other disposition of the work has not
taken place, publication will occur if an authorized offer is made to
dispose of the work in any manner.89
4.2 Publication in Commercial Art Galleries
Questions of publication often occur in the art gallery context.
Suppose the artist in our example placed the painting completed in
1970 in a gallery for sale that year. Typically, the artist may not have
affixed proper copyright notice to the painting.90 If the gallery repro-
duced the work for sale in an advertising brochure, publication would
have occurred. Here, because neither the gallery nor the artist affixed
proper notice, the work would forever be placed in the public do-
main. Nothing could revive its status as a copyrighted work.
But what of a sale of that painting to a member of the general
public without its having been reproduced? This presents a difficult
question in the law of publication, both under the 1909 and the 1976
Acts: whether a sale of a painting in its original form to a member of
the general public is a copy for purposes of publication.9 1 This should
88. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
89. See 1 Nimmer, § 4.04 (4-19) and cases cited therein.
90. See infra note 122.
91. Arguably it is. Even though the 1976 Act defines publication as the "distribution of copies
... of the work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership ... ," in other words, uses
the plural of "copy," implying more than one material embodiment, prior case law has found
publication by the sale or distribution of a single copy. See, e.g., Pierce & Business Mfg. Co. v.
Werckmeister, 72 Fed. 54 (1st Cir. 1896); Burke v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 598 F.2d 688 (1st
Cir. 1979).
The term "copy" is another instance of copyright language differing from everyday use. Most
would infer from "copy" than an original work must preexist the creation of the copy. However,
§ 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act defines copies as including the material object in which the work
is first fixed (emphasis added). Rep. Kastenmeir, who chaired the House Committee, which
reported out the bill, noted the problem of the meaning of publication in the case of a work of
art, such as a painting, which exists in only one copy. He stated on the floor of the House,
It is not the committee's intention that such a work would be regarded as "published"
when the single existing copy is sold or offered for sale in the traditional way-for
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be compared with a sale of a painting by the artist out of his studio
without offering the painting to the general public. Here, publication
has clearly not occurred.
4.3 Publication by Non-Commercial Display of Works of Art
Another problem of publication under the 1909 Act concerns the
display of a work of art without an accompanying offer to sell. 2 Does
such a display constitute a publication sufficient to divest common
law copyright? The law is not entirely clear on this issue, but indicates
that publication depends on the circumstances of the display. Gener-
ally, such a display or exhibit did not constitute a publication if the
public were admitted to view the work of art with the understanding,
express or implied, that no copying would take place and that these
restrictions were enforced by the museum.3
In sum, the above examples show how important it is for anyone
acquiring a work of art to determine the circumstances relating to the
publication of a work created before 1978. Often this is impossible to
do without the proper records, particularly when a work has been
resold several times. Nevertheless, the museum should take pains to
unearth publication history before acquiring copyright to a work or it
may be unpleasantly surprised to find that the work has been injected
into the public domain. To repeat, the current Act will not revive a
work that has gone into the public domain by acts committed before
1978. 94
example, through an art dealer, gallery, or auction house. On the other hand, where
the work has been made for reproduction in multiple copies-as in the case of fine
prints such as lithographs-or where multiple reproductions of the prototype work are
offered for purchase by the public-as in the case of castings from a statue or
reproductions made from a photograph of a painting-publication would take place
at the point when reproduced copies are publicly distributed or when, even if only one
copy exists at that point, reproductions are offered for purchase by multiple members
of the public.
122 Cong. Rec. H.10, 874-75 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976).
92. See generally Jonakait, "Do Art Exhibitions Destroy Common-Law Copyright in Works
of Art?" 19 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 81 (1971).
93. The leading case for the proposition that where circumstances of an exhibition indicated
that care was taken to deter copying, publication did not take place is American Tobacco Co. v.
Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907). See also, Carns v. Keefe Bros., 242 Fed. 745 (D. Mont.
1917) (holding that statue of elk was displayed in unrestricted circumstances which amounted to
publication, in spite of putative copyright notice); Morton v. Raphael, 334 Ill. App. 399, 79
N.E.2d 522 (1948) (holding that murals on walls of hotel room were published when they could
be seen by anyone who visited the hotel); and Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 297 F. Supp. 107
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1969) (statute published when
displayed without restriction as to either persons or on the copying or photographing of the
statue).
94. See, e.g., Lynn Goldsmith v. Peter Max, 213 U.S.P.Q. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding
that photograph of Mick Jagger used in later collage by defendant artist had been injected into
the public domain prior to 1978, and therefore not entitled to protection under the 1976 Act).
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4.4 Continuing Importance of Publication
Although the current Copyright Act has greatly reduced the impor-
tance of publication, this event is still of great significance in the law
of copyright for a number of reasons. First, the Copyright Act specifi-
cally requires notice on all published copies of the work and the notice
confers certain procedural and substantive rights under the Copyright
Act. 5 For example, the registration certificate can constitute prima
facie evidence of the validity of the copyright if the work is registered
within five years of the first publication.96 In addition, statutory
damages and attorney's fees are available for published works if regis-
tration is effected within three months after first publication.97
Thus, publication and notice formalities continue to be of impor-
tance under the current Copyright Act. Even though it is much more
difficult to inject a work into the public domain, the museum should
ensure that notice is affixed to all works on which it owns a copyright
interest, particularly on those published. In addition, the museum
should promptly register all works in which it has an ownership
interest.9 8
4.5 Forfeiture of Copyright Under the Current Act
How then can copyright be forfeited under the current Act for
works created after January 1, 1978? It is difficult, but possible, to
forfeit copyright. 9 One can inject a work into the public domain if
notice is omitted from a substantial number of copies 00 and if regis-
95.
Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the United States or
elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a notice of copyright as provided by
this section shall be placed on all publicly distributed copies from which the work can
be visually perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1982).
96.
In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five
years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the
validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.
17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982).
97. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
98. See infra notes 103-15 and accompanying text.
99. See generally Levine & Squires, Notice, Deposit and Registration: The Importance of
Being Formal, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1232 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Levine & Squires].
100.
The omission of the copyright notice . . . from copies or phonorecords publicly
distributed by authority of the copyright owner does not invalidate the copyright in a
work if-
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tration of the work is not made within five years of the publication. In
addition to registration, a reasonable effort to add notice to the copies
is required to save the copyright on a work.' 0'
To illustrate the above principles, let us return to our introductory
example. Suppose the museum decides to purchase the photo-realist
painting finished in 1979 and its copyright. Assume that the artist
consigned the painting to a gallery and gave the gallery the right to
offer the painting for sale to the public as the gallery saw fit. In so
doing, the gallery produced a brochure with a photograph of the
painting and disseminated it to the public without placing notice of
copyright anywhere on the brochure. Shortly thereafter, the museum
acquired the painting with its copyright. Here to avoid injecting the
work into the public domain, the museum should promptly (certainly
no more than five years after the publication) register the claim to
copyright and make a reasonable effort to affix notice to copies of the
brochure that could yet be distributed to the public.
As the example illustrates, to avoid unnecessary difficulties the
museum should affix notice to all works it owns and promptly register
them. It should do so in a mechanical way and should establish a
formal administrative procedure to accomplish this goal. It should
register not only works of art, but any work that the museum pro-
(1) the notice has been omitted from no more than a relatively small number of copies
or phonorecords distributed to the public;
17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(1) (1982).
101.
[Rlegistration for the work has been made before or is made within five years after the
publication without notice, and a reasonable effort is made to add notice to all copies
or phonorecords that are distributed to the public in the United States after the
omission has been discovered;
17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) (1982).
Thus, if notice is omitted from more than a "relatively small number" of copies.
copyright is not lost immediately, but the work will go into the public domain if no
effort is made to correct the error or if the work is not registered within five years.
H.R. Report at 147.
See Florists' Transworld Delivery Ass'n v. Reliable Glassware, 213 U.S.P.Q. 808 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment and set for trial on question of
reasonable effort where plaintiff, upon discovering that 1,200,000 vases packed for shipment
lacked notice, mailed labels with notice to each flower shop with instructions to affix label to
each vase).
It is open to debate whether deliberate omission of notice irrevocably injects the work into the
public domain or may be rectified by later reasonable effort. See conflicting decisions in O'Neill
Developments v. Galen Kilbur, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that deliberate
omission may be cured); and Beacon Looms, Inc. v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., 552 F. Supp. 1305
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding only unintentional omissions qualify under § 405(a)(2). See also
discussion in 2 Nimmer, § 7.13[B](3) and Patton and Hogan, The Copyright Notice Require-
ment-Deliberate Omission of Notice, 5 Comm/Ent L. J. 225 (1982-83).
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duces, such as brochures, catalogues, or audio-visual programs. Un-
fortunately, it appears that not many museums have instituted clear
administrative procedures for copyright matters.1
0 2
5. FORMALITIES
5.1 Registration
Registration of a claim to copyright is permissive, confers no owner-
ship right, and has no durational consequence. 0 3 But registration does
confer valuable benefits, 10 4 is relatively inexpensive, 0 5 and is easy to
execute. Accordingly, the museum should systematically and
promptly register all significant works in which it has a copyright
interest. 06 Moreover, the ease and simplicity of registration does not
necessitate the use of an attorney; administrative personnel can handle
registration formalities. The Copyright. Office has issued short and
self-explanatory registration forms specified for the type of work being
registered."°7 One or two deposit copies must accompany the registra-
102. The lack of thorough copyright procedures is indicated in Weber-Karlitz, Survey; Muse-
ums, Artists & Copyright, 2 Cardozo Arts & Eng. L.J. 121 (1983), particularly the summary of
museum responses.
103.
At anytime during the subsistence of copyright in any published or unpublished work,
the owner of copyright or of any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration of
the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this
section, together with the application and fee specified by sections 409 and 708.
Subject to the provisions of section 405(a), such registration is not a condition of
copyright protection.
17 U.S.C. § 408 (1982).
104. See, e.g., supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
105. A $10 fee is charged for each registration. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(c)(2) (1982). See Copyright
Office Circular R4, Copyright Fees Effective January 1, 1978. For museums and others who
might utilize registration frequently, the Copyright Office allows the maintenance of a Deposit
Account, obviating the need to send a separate check with each registration. See Copyright
Office Circular R5, How to Open and Maintain a Deposit Account in The Copyright Office.
106. According to the Copyright Office regulations, an application for copyright may be
submitted by "any author or other copyright claimant of a work, or the owner of any exclusive
right in a work ...." 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(c)(1) (1982). Even if a museum owns only the right of
reproduction to a work, rather than the entire copyright (see infra note 222 and accompanying
text), the museum, if the author has not already done so, can register the copyright. If the
museum is unclear whether or not a particular work was registered, it is possible to initiate a
copyright investigation. For a fee, the Copyright Office will make a search of its records. See
Copyright Office Circular R22, How to Investigate The Copyright Status of a Work. For the
importance of recordation of assignments and licenses, see infra notes 230-39 and accompanying
text.
107. Of particular interest to a museum would be: Form VA, for a work of the visual arts (for
paintings, sculpture, prints, including derivative works such as postcards and photographic
slides); Form TX, for non-dramatic literary works (for example, exhibitions, catalogue, quar-
terly bulletin); and Form SR for sound recordings (e.g., audio-visual sound track for gallery
tout).
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tion form 0 8 and copyright registration is effective once the applica-
tion, fee and deposit copy are received.109 The Office examines the
application and deposit copies to see that they are in proper form; it
neither evaluates the worth of the claim nor compares the claim with
earlier works.' 10
What will the museum obtain in return for the ten dollar registra-
tion fee and the time spent on filling out the forms? The benefits are
many. Registration is an essential step in preventing forfeiture of
copyright for a work published without notice."' Second, registration
is required before bringing an infringement suit." 2 Third, registration
108.
[Tihe owner of copyright or of the exclusive right of publication in a work published
with notice of copyright in the United States shall deposit, within three months after
the date of such publication-
(1) two complete copies of the best edition; or
(2) if the work is a sound recording, two complete phonorecords of the best edition,
together with any printed or other visually perceptible material published with
such phonorecords ...
17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1982).
Unlike the simplicity of sendng two copies of an exhibition catalogue, it would clearly be
impractical for an artist or a museum to send a copy of a work of art. By statutory authority (17
U.S.C. § 408 (1982)), the Copyright Office has provided that in the case of pictorial or graphic or
sculptured works of art, identifying material may be deposited instead of a copy. 37 C.F.R. §
202.20(c) (2)(iv), (ix) (1982). See also Copyright Office Curcular R40b, Deposit Requirements for
Registration of Claims to Copyright in Visual Arts Material. Copyright Office Circular R40a,
Specifications for Visual Arts Identifying Material, sets out the requirements for such material,
e.g., photographic transparencies of a particular size, reproducing actual colors used, if the work
is a pictorial or graphic work. Note that the Copyright Office regulations exempt picture
postcards from deposit. 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c)(2) (1982). The Copyright Office has published lists
of criteria to be applied in determining the best edition of each of several types of material, e.g.,
for printed textual matter, hard cover rather than soft cover. See Copyright Office Circular R76,
Best Edition of Published Copyrighted Works for The Collections of The Library of Congress.
109.
The effective date of a copyright registration is the day on which an application,
deposit, and fee, which are later determined by the Register of Copyrights or by a
court of competent jurisdiction to be acceptable for registration, have all been received
in the Copyright Office.
17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (1982).
110. See Kaplan, The Registration of Copyright, in 17 Studies on Copyright 325 (Arthur
Fisher Mem. Ed. 1963).
III.
The omission of the copyright notice. . . does not invalidate the copyright in a work if
(2) registration for the work has been made before or is made within five years
after the publication without notice ..
17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1982).
112.
...no action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title. . ..
17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1982).
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within five years of publication establishes prima facie proof of copy-
right and validity." 3 Fourth, registration within three months of
publication may allow the copyright owner to recover certain mone-
tary remedies in an action for infringement." 4 Finally, registration
confers constructive notice of the contents of certain filed docu-
ments. 11 5 From the above, it is clear that prompt registration is well
worth the small amount of time and expense required.
Applying these principles to our introductory example, there are
many opportunities for filing claims for registration in the Copyright
Office. The museum should consider filing for the 1970 and 1979
paintings, the photographs, the exhibition catalogue, the posters and
the audio-visual program, to name a few. The museum may or may
not wish to register all of these works, but if proper administrative
procedures are in place, it could do so promptly and efficiently.
5.2 Notice and Methods of Affixation
To prevent the possibility of a work involuntarily entering the
public domain, the museum should affix copyright notice to all pub-
lished copies."16 If notice is defective or incomplete, it may constitute
113.
In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five
years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the
validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.
17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1982).
114.
In any action under this title. . . no award of statutory damages or of attorney's fees.
.. shall be made for . . . any infringement of copyright commenced after first
publication of the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such
registration is made within three months after the first publication of the work.
17 U.S.C. § 412 (1982).
115.
Recordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all persons constructive
notice of the facts stated in the recorded document, but only if. . . (2) registration has
been made for the work.
17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1982).
116. Although recognizing the burden on copyright owners to place notice on their works, the
drafters of the 1976 Act determined that notice serves several principal functions: (1) it places in
the public domain, material no one has an interest in copyrighting, (2) it informs the public
whether a particular work has been copyrighted, (3) it identifies the copyright owner, and (4) it
gives the date of publication. H.R. Report at 143. See generally Roth, Is Notice Necessary?: An
Analysis of The Notice Provisions of The Copyright Law Revision, 27 Copyright L. Symp.
(ASCAP) 245 (1982); Levine & Squires, supra note 99, at 1236-1253; Note, Copyright Notice
Placement for The Visual Artist, 7 Colum. J. of Art and L. 281 (1983); and Crawford, The New
Copyright Law: Help in Half-Measures, 65 Art in America (Sept.-Oct. 1977) at 11, 12, 15
(criticizing requirement of notice).
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no notice at all." 7 In addition to proper notice, the other preventive
measure to avoid forfeiture of copyright is prompt registration of the
work." 8 Consequently, museum personnel should understand the
proper methods to affix notice and develop procedures for the system-
atic registration of works.
Notice of copyright consists of three elements: ©, or copyr., or
copyright; the name of the owner of the copyright; and the date of
first publication." 9 A typical notice may look like this: © John Doe,
1983. As for position of notice, the current Act provides that notice
shall be affixed in a manner and location to afford reasonable notice
of the claim to copyright. 120 Of particular interest to the museum, the
Register of Copyrights has issued a regulation indicating the position
and manner of notice appropriate for various categories of works such
as pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, audio-visual works and
literary works.12' The museum should have a copy of this regulation
on hand if any questions of proper notice should arise.
Museums and artists have traditionally omitted notice from works
of art, perhaps because they were unaware of the requirement, or
117. Care should be taken by anyone affixing notice to see that it is in proper form. Certain
errors in fixation of notice are considered by the Copyright Act to constitute a complete omission
of notice and therefor subject the copyright owner to forfeiture. For example, § 406(b) "The year
date is more than one year later than the year in which publication first occurred, the work is
considered to have been published without any notice." Similarly, under § 406(c), omission of
name or date from publicly distributed copies is also considered omission of notice with the same
possible result of forfeiture.
The second variety of incorrect notice does not subject the copyright owner to forfeiture, but
can be used as a defense to an infringement action if the alleged infringer shows that he was
misled by the incorrect notice. See § 405(b), § 406(a) and § 406(b). For a discussion of infringe-
ment see infra notes 265-79 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
119.
The notice appearing on the copies shall consist of the following three elements:
(1) the symbol © (the letter C in a circle), or the word "Copyright," or the abbrevia-
tion "Copr."; and
(2) the year of first publication of the work ...; and
(3) the name of the owner of copyright in the work, or an abbreviation by which the
name can be recognized, or a generally known alternative designation of the
owner.
17 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1982).
120. 17 U.S.C. § 401(c) (1982).
121. 37 C.F.R. § 201.20 (1982). It should be noted that these regulations are not to be
interpreted in a limiting way:
A notice placed or affixed in accordance with the regulations would clearly meet the
requirements, but, since the Register's specifications are not to "be considered exhaus-
tive," a notice placed or affixed in some other way might also comply with the law if it
were found to "give reasonable notice" of the copyright claim."
H.R. Report at 144.
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perhaps they thought that copyright notice would deface the painting
or sculpture. 2 2 These beliefs are not justified; notice is easy to apply
and need not affect the visual image of the work. For two-dimensional
works, notice must be durably affixed, directly or by label, to the
front or back of the work or to other material to which the copies are
permanently housed.123 The same applies to three-dimensional works
except that notice must be placed on a visible portion of the work. 24 It
is interesting to note that the year date may be omitted on pictorial
and graphic works that are reproduced in useful articles such as
postcards, stationery, jewelry, dolls and toys. 25
Of importance to the museum is the appropriate placement of
notice on material with repetitive designs such as wrapping or writing
paper. This issue was unclear under the 1909 Act.
For example, was one required to place notice on each design or
could notice be placed on the margin or selvage of the fabric?126 The
current Act has clarified this problem, and consistent with the policy
of flexibility, 27 the Register's regulations allow notice on the repro-
122. A 1973 survey revealed that of 206 artists questioned, 71.8% did not place copyright
notice on their works. Many were simply unaware of possible copyright protection, as were the
gallery owners to whom they looked for information concerning legal rights. Other factors
impeding copyright use were fears that notice would deface the work of art or commercialize it,
and that copyright would deter future buyers. Sheehan, Why Don't Fine Artists Use Statutory
Copyright, 22 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 242 (1975). See also Note, Statutory Copyright-A Valuable
Right for The Visual Artist, 7 Ga. L. Rev. 134 (1972).
123. 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(i)(1) (1982).
124. 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(i)(2), (3) (1982).
125.
The year date may be omitted where a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, with
and accompanying text matter, if any, is reproduced in or on greeting cards, post-
cards, stationery, jewelry, dolls, toys, or any useful articles; ....
17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(2) (1982).
126. See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960)
(where copyright notice placed on selvage of fabric was removed from view by dress manufac-
turers, court held that in the case of a deliberate copyist, the absence of notice must be proven by
the copyist who must show that the notice could have been embodied in the design without
impairing its market value). Cf. Dejonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 235 U.S. 33 (1914)
(holding that where sheet of gift wrapping paper contained twelve squares of design, the
copyright notice should have been affixed to each square).
127. Unlike the prior act, under which insufficient and/or unintended omission of notice
could prove fatal for protection, the 1976 Act is much more flexible. The drafters recognized that
there were other inducements for notice than outright forfeiture.
The provisions [effect of omission of copyright] make clear that the notice require-
ments . . . are not absolute and that, unlike the law now in effect, the outright
omission of a copyright notice does not automatically forfeit protection and throw the
work into the public domain. This not only represents a major change in the theoreti-
cal framework of American copyright law, but it also seems certain to have immediate
practical consequences in a great many individual cases. . . . Thus, if notice is omitted
from more than a "relatively small number" of copies . . . . copyright is not lost
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duction itself, on the margin or selvage, on tags, or labels or contain-
ers housing the material. 128
6. DURATION
6.1 Works Created After 1978
The duration of a copyright is complicated because one must take
into account both the 1909 Act and the current Act. 129 We shall first
discuss duration under the current Act which bases the term of copy-
right on when the work was created, i.e., fixed in a tangible medium
of expression. For works created after 1978, the basic term of copy-
right begins on creation and lasts for the life of the author plus fifty
years. 30 As a result, how long a copyright lasts will depend on the
longevity of the author, rather than on an arbitrary amount of
time. '31 To illustrate, suppose that an artist finishes paintings in 1978,
immediately, but the work will go into the public domain if no effort is made to
correct the error or if the work is not registered within five years.
H.R. Report at 146-47. It is for court interpretation to determine what constitutes a "relatively
small number of copies." See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc. 684
F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that the sale of 400 out of 40,000 dolls without copyright
notice constituted the "relatively few" indicated under § 405(a)(1) of the 1976 Act and that the
inadvertent omission of the co-author's name did not render the registration invalid.) But cf.
James DeWitt King v. Winston A. Burnette, Copyright L. Rep. (CCH), § 25,489 (D.C. 1982)
(holding that artist's sculpture, though registered for copyright, entered the public domain
because 300 to 500 of the 1,335 replicas which he had authorized to be sold and distributed were
published without copyright notice and there was no showing that he had made a reasonable
effort to add notice to the distributed copies.) Note in this case that the artist had registered the
work prior to distribution. The Copyright Act is silent on this situation.
128. 37 C.F.R. § 201.20(i)(4) (1982).
129. See generally Cohen, Duration, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1180 (1977); Rothenberg, Old
Copyrights, Old Copyright Lawyers and the New Copyright Act, 29 J. of Copyright Soc'y 395
(1982).
130.
Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation
and, except as provided by the following subsections, endures for a term consisting of
the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death.
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982).
131. There are many instances where the date of the author's death would be unknown.
Section 302(d) provides that any person having an interest in a copyright may record in the
Copyright Office a statement of the date of death of the author of the copyrighted work, or a
statement that the author was still alive on a particular date. The Register of Copyrights is then
required to maintain current obituary records.
Section 302(e) provides a method of establishing a presumption as to an author's death. After a
specified period of time, a person may obtain from the Copyright Office a certified statement
that their records do not indicate that the author is living or died less than fifty years before. The
person is then entitled to a presumption that the author has been dead more than fifty years and
reliance in good faith on this presumption is a complete defense to an action for infringement of
copyright.
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1979 and 1980, dying in 1980. The duration of copyright for these
works will last until 2030, fifty years after the death of the author.
Thus, for individually created works, the Copyright Act establishes a
basic term of life plus fifty years and this will account for all works
which are not anonymous, pseudonymous, or works made for hire.1
3 2
This latter category, works made for hire, is economically signifi-
cant because many works are created in the course of one's employ-
ment. 13 3 For these works, along with anonymous and pseudonymous
works, a different duration applies. Here, the term is seventy-five
years after publication or one hundred years after creation, whichever
is shorter.134 For example, an exhibition catalogue prepared by a
museum staff member as an employment duty in 1980 would have a
term of copyright expiring in 2080; but if the work were published in
2000, the term would last until 2075. This would constitute the basic
term of copyright no matter how long the life of the museum staff
member.
Considering events which will take place fifty or more years in the
future gives the question of duration of copyright under the current
Act an air of unreality. But duration is of more immediate concern for
works created before 1978.
6.2 Works Created and Published Before 1978
Under the 1909 Act, the term of copyright begins on the publication
of a work. The 1909 Act set up a system of two copyright terms, a first
132.
An "anonymous work" is a work on the copies or phonorecords of which no natural
person is identified as author . . .
A "pseudonymous work" is a work on the copies or phonorecords of which the
author is identified under a fictitious name...
A "work for hire" is
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a "supplementary work" is a work
prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for
the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, com-
menting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords,
afterwords, pictorial illustrations; maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical
arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes,
and an "instruction text" is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for
publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
133. See infra notes 240-56 and accompanying text.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1982).
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term of twenty-eight years and a renewal term of twenty-eight years,
for a total of fifty-six years. The second or renewal term was not
automatically granted, and a copyright owner was required to file a
renewal claim in the Copyright Office. Failure to do so during the
twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth years would cause the work to
enter the public domain. 35 These renewal provisions still apply to all
works copyrighted under the 1909 Act in their first term of copy-
right.136 For example, the copyright of the photo-realist painting pub-
lished in 1970 must be renewed in 1997. Although the current Act has
extended the second or renewal term from twenty-eight to forty-seven
years, 137 the second term must be timely and properly claimed. 138
Because of these renewal provisions, the museum administrator
should take an inventory of all works whose first copyright term of
twenty-eight years will soon expire. 139 Following this inventory, a
renewal registration should be filed in the Copyright Office for the
museum to benefit from another forty-seven years of copyright protec-
tion. Even if there is some doubt about ownership of the renewal
term, the museum should file a renewal registration as a precaution
for the copyright to continue to be protected.
The above discussion involves works in their first term of copyright
when the new Act became effective. But what of works that were
already in their second term as of 1978? Here, the current Copyright
Act has extended the renewal term another nineteen years to comprise
135. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909) (superseded 1976).
136.
Any copyright, the first term of which is subsisting on January 1, 1978, shall endure
for twenty-eight years from the date it was originally secured ...
17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1982).
137. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1982).
138.
.. . in default of the registration of such application for renewal and extension, the
copyright in any work shall terminate at the expiration of twenty-eight years from the
date copyright was originally secured.
17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1982).
139. The museum should take notice of a special situation which exists for works originally
copyrighted between September 19, 1920, and renewed between September 19, 1934 and
September 19, 1948. A series of interim bills were enacted by Congress to keep their renewal
period alive, in the expectation that a copyright revision act would imminently be passed. The
last such interim law maintained renewals through December 31, 1976. See Latman at 89 and
H.R. Report at 139-40, for listing of relevant Public Law numbers. The 1976 Act, by § 304(b),
increased the renewal term for seventy-five years from the date the copyright was originally
secured. Therefore, these copyrights which were extended earlier, are extended again by lesser
amounts, but in no case for longer than a total term of seventy-five years. The copyright on
works published in 1906 went into the public domain in 1981.
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a renewal term of forty-seven years. 140 Nothing need be done to
acquire this additional duration. In effect, all works in their first or
second term on the effective date of the current Act can now enjoy
seventy-five years of copyright protection.
6.3 Works Created But Not Published Before 1978
The last durational problem concerns works which were created,
but not published before 1978. These works typically include letters,
diaries, manuscripts, and works of art in a museum collection which
were never sold, exhibited, or reproduced for public distribution. The
copyright for these works will endure for the life of the author plus
fifty years, but protection will not terminate, regardless of the death
date of the author, until 2002. If these unpublished works are pub-
lished before 2002, protection under copyright will last an extra
twenty-five years until 2027.141 Although 2002 seems many years off,
the museum should consider systematically publishing such works to
benefit from the additional duration. For example, black and white
photographs of these works placed in a publicly distributed bulletin
would serve this purpose.
7. RENEWAL AND TERMINATION OF TRANSFERS
7.1 Renewal
An enormous number of copyrighted works were published before
1978, many of which are now in their first or second term of copy-
right. For works in their first term, the acquisition of the renewal
term is an important consideration and is a subject fraught with traps
for the unwary.
One may erroneously believe that the formalities of renewal regis-
tration no longer apply after 1978. This misunderstanding may have
140.
The duration of any copyright, the renewal term of which is subsisting at any time
between December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977, inclusive, or for which renewal
is registration is made bgetween December 31, 1976, and December 31, 1977, inclu-
sive, is extended to endure for a term of seventy-five years from the date copyright was
originally secured.
17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1982).
141.
Copyright in a work created before January 1, 1978, but not theretofore in the public
domain or copyrighted, subsists from January 1, 1978, and endures for the term
provided by section 302. In no case, however, shall the term of copyright in such a
work expire before December 31, 2002; and, if the work is published on or before
December 31, 2002, the term of copyright shall not expire before December 31, 2027.
17 U.S.C. § 303 (1982).
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the effect of inadvertently ejecting a work into the public domain. A
renewal registration must be filed in the Copyright Office to claim the
renewal term. 142 If a renewal registration is not timely filed, copyright
is permanently lost.1 43 The registration for renewal must be filed
within the year preceding the termination of the first term of copy-
right. 144
Who owns the second renewal term is an area of potential confu-
sion. Unless specifically contracted for, the second renewal term re-
verts to the author. 45 Thus, if the museum is interested in the second
renewal term, it should make this a matter of express written contract
with the author.
If the author lives until the second renewal term begins, such
contractual arrangements are honored by the courts. 46 But, what if
the author dies before the second renewal term begins? Here, the
Copyright Act sets forth the rights of ownership and despite all pre-
vious contractual arrangements, the renewal right automatically goes
to the surviving spouse and children, or to as riany of them as are
living, or as a group, rather than to one who has bought the copyright
142. See Form RE and Copyright Office Circular 15, Renewal of Copyright.
143.
[I]n default of the registration of . . . application for renewal and extension, the
copyright in any work shall terminate at the expiration of twenty-eight years from the
date copyright was originally secured.
17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1982).
The Copyright Office has no discretion to extend the renewal time limits.
37 C.F.R. § 202.17 (1982).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1982). Protection is extended to the end of the calendar year in
which the twenty-eighth year ends.
All terms of copyright . . . run to the end of the calendar year in which they would
otherwise expire.
17 U.S.C. § 305 (1982). Therefore, if the museum purchased a painting which was copyrighted
in May, 1960, the renewal must be filed before December 31, 1988. This avoids the confusion
engendered by the 1909 Act which ran the first term from "the date of first publication." 17
U.S.C. § 24 (1909, superceded 1978). The purpose of this change was to make the duration easier
to compute. H.R. Report at 142.
145.
[T]he author of such work . . .shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the
copyright .... for a further term of forty-seven years ....
17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1982).
146. See, e.g., Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmkark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943) (holding
that an author (here the composer of "When Irish Eyes Are Smiling") can validly assign his right
to renewal of his copyright by an agreement made prior to the expiration of the original
copyright term). These are considered questions of contract and controlled by state law. See,
e.g., Dolch v. United California Bank, 702 F.2d (9th Cir. 1983) (denying federal jurisdiction in
case involving claim of invalidity of assignment of renewal rights for lack of consideration).
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from the author. 47 The effect of this rule is that a transferee will be
deprived of copyright ownership if the author of the work dies before
the renewal begins. For example, if the artist of the photo-realist
painting has published his work in 1970 and has sold it to the museum
along with the copyright, renewal must be claimed in 1997-98. If the
artist has transferred both terms of copyright and is still alive in 1998
when the renewal begins,the museum will accede to the second term.
If, however, the artist dies before 1998, then the renewal term will
revert to the widow or children, or to both.' 48
The purpose of this provision is to allow the author's family to
benefit from a work which may have become famous at a later
time. 4 Thus, the two separate terms of copyright were designed to
protect artists and their families who may have signed away valuable
rights under economic duress or ignorance. To avoid the reversion of
the renewal term, it became common practice for a transferee to seek
out the author's wife and children to persuade them to sell their rights
if the author died before the vesting of the renewal term.
7.2 Termination of Transfer
The renewal provisions only apply to works published before 1978
in their first term of copyright. For works created after 1978, renewal
147.
[T]he widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living. . . shall
be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright ...
17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1982).
148. If there is only a surviving spouse and no children, she or he will receive the entire
termination interest. If there are surviving children or grandchildren as well, then the spouse
receives one-half of the artist's interest and the children and grandchildren take one-half interest
per stirpes. For example, if the artist and his wife had three children, one child having died
leaving two children, these two grandchildren of the artist would share a one-sixth interest in the
termination interest. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(A), (B) and (C) (1982). In order for the termination to
be effected, it must be carried out by persons who are entitled to exercise more than one-half of
the author's interest. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1) (1982). Therefore, if there are children and/or
grandchildren, the widow must be joined with at least one other person before she can act. These
provisions, dealing with renewal in the case of death of the author, are identical to the provisions
of the statute relating to termination of transfer in works created after 1978. See 17 U.S.C. § 203
(1982) and infra notes 150-66 and accompanying text. See also H.R. Report at 125 and General
Guide to the Copyright Act of 1976 (1977) at 6:2, 6:3. For some of the intricacies posed by the
language of this section, see DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (holding: (1) that widow
and children succeed to the right of renewal as a class, each being entitled to share in the renewal
term; and (2) in order to determine whether an illegitimate child came within the term
"children," reference must be made to state law). If there is no surviving spouse, child or
grandchild, then the right to renewal rests in the author's executors, or in the absence of a will,
his or her next of kin. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1982).
149. See generally, Ringer, Renewal of Copyright, in 1 Studies on Copyright 503 (Arthur
Fisher Mem. Ed., 1963).
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no longer applies. In its place, serving the same protective function, a
termination of transfer is allowed by the current Act. A termination of
transfer1 50 may be exercised by the author or his heirs between the
thirty-fifth and fortieth years after the date of the grant. 151 Because
this termination right is a special privilege given by the Copyright
Act, it cannot be bargained away. 152 The termination right extends to
all works except works made for hire. 153 The other major limitation to
termination is that it applies only to grants given by a living author
made after December 31, 1977;154 grants by will are not subject to
termination. 1 5
5
The major affirmative obligation imposed on the artist and his heirs
is that notice of termination must be given in writing, specifying the
date of termination within the appropriate five-year period. 156 One
must give notice at least two years, but not more than ten years,
150. A transfer is a sale of a copyright interest, for example, an exclusive license for the right
of reproduction of a painting might be sold by the artist to a calendar manufacturer.
151.
Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period of five years
beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the grant: ....
17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1982).
152.
The provisions of section 203 are based on the premise that . . . the proposed law
should substitute for [revisionary provisions] a provision safeguarding authors against
unreminerative transfers. A provision of this sort is needed because of the unequal
bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining
a work's value until it has been exploited.
H.R. Report at 124.
153.
In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the. . . grant of a transfer.
. . is subject to termination. ...
17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982).
154.
In the case of any work, other than a work made for hire, the exclusive or non-
exclusive grant . . . executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978....
17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982).
155.
[T]he. . . grant of a transfer. . . executed by the author. . . otherwise than by will,
is subject to termination . . ..
17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982).
156.
The termination shall be effected by serving an advance notice in writing ...
(A) The notice shall state the effective date of the termination, which shall fall within
the five-year period ....
17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4) (1976).
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before the termination date., 7 If, for example, the artist transferred
copyright ownership for the painting created in 1979 to the museum
in 1980, the artist or his heirs may terminate the transfer between
2016 and 2021 by filing the appropriate written notice no less than
two, but not more than ten years, before the date of termination. Note
that the responsibility for termination is placed upon the artist or his
heirs; the museum is not obligated to alert the transferor of his right to
terminate. Thus, if the artist or his heirs failed to exercise their termi-
nation rights in a timely manner, the museum will benefit from the
entire duration of copyright. Involving all copyrighted works except
for those made for hire, the termination right will eventually prove to
be one of the most economically significant provisions of the current
Act. 158
Inasmuch as this discussion refers to events taking place some dec-
ades in the future, it may seem like a purely theoretical exercise. Yet
such is not the case. Termination of transfer is of immediate concern
because it applies to the second renewal term of copyright which has
been extended from twenty-eight to forty-seven years. 59 The addi-
tional nineteen years of protection are now subject to termination
with several qualifications. The right to terminate applies only to
transfers made before January 1, 1978.110 It will not apply to works
made for hire' 6 ' or grants made by will. 62 It is thus now possible for
an author's surviving spouse or children to terminate any transfer of a
copyright interest, allowing them to reclaim all or part of the addi-
tional nineteen years of the second renewal term.16 3
157.
• . . the notice shall be served not less than two or more than ten years before that
date.
17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4) (1976).
158. For discussions of this highly complex topic, see generally Curtis, Caveat Emptor in
Copyright: A Practical Guide to the Termination of Transfers Under the New Copyright Code,
25 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 19 (1977); Nimmer, Termination of Transfers Under the Copyright Act
of 1976, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 947 (1977); and Stein, Termination of Transfers and Licenses Under
the New Copyright Act: Theory Problems for the Copyright Bar, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1141
(1977). For focus on the problems arising for the derivative work if the proprietor of the
underlying work terminatesthe transfer, see Ellingson, The Copyright Exception for Derivative
Works and The Scope Of Utilization, 56 Ind. L.J. 1 (1980); Mimms, Reversion and Derivative
Works Under the Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1982, 25 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 595 (1980).
159. 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1982).
160. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1982).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163.
Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is owned, and may. be
exercised, by his widow or her widower and his or her children or grandchildren ....
17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2) (1982).
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The mechanics of termination for these works are similar to termi-
nation for post-1978 works. Termination may take effect at any time
during the five-year period beginning either fifty-six years from the
date that copyright in the work was first secured, or January 1, 1978,
whichever date is later. 6 4 The terminating party must give written
notice not more than ten years, and not less than two years, before the
date of termination is to take effect.16 5 Notice procedures must comply
with Copyright Office regulations.1
6
Because the possibility of termination of copyright always exists, the
museum must adjust to economic realities. It should inventory works
whose second renewal term is to expire in the near future. For exam-
ple, works renewed in 1958 in which the museum owns the copyright
are subject to termination by the author or his heirs by giving the
prescribed written notice in 1986. Such written notice will reclaim the
extra nineteen years of protection and unless the museum renegotiates,
it will no longer be able to make use of the work. As in the case of
post-1978 terminations, there is no affirmative duty for the museum to
notify the artist about the termination right. Similarly, the museum
will not have to concern itself about termination of grants given by
will or works made for hire, which are not subject to termination.
8. EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
8.1 In General
Copyright springs into existence when a work of authorship is
created and its ownership vests in an author. We now turn to what it
means to own a copyright and what are the practical benefits of that
ownership. Generally, a copyright consists of a bundle of rights,
known as the exclusive rights. The Copyright Act enumerates five
exclusive rights: 6 7 the reproduction right, the adaptation right, the
164. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3) (1982).
165. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4)(A) (1982).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4)(B) (1982). For regulations promulgated by the Copyright Office,
see, 37 C.F.R. § 201.10 (1982).
167.
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize
any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly; and
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distribution right, the performance right and the display right.
"
Copyright ownership is therefore not absolute: every unauthorized use
of copyrighted work is not an infringement of copyright. A use of a
copyrighted work is an infringing use if, and only if, it falls within the
scope of the enumerated rights. 69
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work pub-
licly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
168. The enumerated rights recognized under § 106 do not include the concept of moral
rights. An extensive review of moral rights, or droit moral, that is, the continuing interest of the
artist in his work after sale, is beyond the scope of this article. "Moral rights" is an umbrella
term, and is generally said to include, inter alia, the right of paternity or authorship, the right of
integrity or protection against distortion or mutilation, and the right of honor or reputation.
Although widely recognized in civil law countries, moral rights have not been specifically
recognized in this country with the exception of California, see infra discussion in text. See
generally Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and
Creators, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 554 (1940); Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27
Hastings L. Rev. 1023 (1976); 2 Nimmer, § 8.21. Over the years, several bills dealing with moral
rights have been introduced in Congress. The most recent is H.R. 1521, Visual Artists' Moral
Rights Amendment of 1983, introduced by Rep. Barney Frank. This bill would amend the
copyright law so that the artist or the artist's representative, independent of the copyright, would
have the right to protect his work from distortion, mutilation, or alteration done without his
consent. This right would endure for the same period as the copyright, life of the author plus
fifty years. Some commentators maintain that libel laws, the expanding concept of the right to
privacy and restrictions on unfair competition provide adequate protections. See, e.g., Treece,
American Law Analogues of the Author's Moral Right, 16 Am. J. Comp. L. 487 (1968); Note,
Protection of Artistic Integrity: Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
473 (1976); Comment, Moral Rights for Artists Under the Lanham Act, 18 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
595 (1977); Comment, The Mony Python Litigation of Moral Right and The Lanham Act, 125
U. Pa. L. Rev. 611 (1977).
California recently passed the California Art Preservation Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 987 (West
Supp. 1981), incorporating the moral rights doctrines of right of privacy and integrity. This act
allows an artist who suffers a wrong to his work in California to bring a civil action and request
injunctive relief and damages. For review of the act, see Gantz, Protecting Artists' Moral Rights:
A Critique of the California Art Preservation Act as a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 873 (1981); Francione, The California Art Preservation Act and Federal Preemp-
tion by the 1976 Copyright Act-Equivalence and Actual Conflict, 18 Cal. W.L. Rev. 189
(1982); Comment, The California Art Preservation Act: A Safe Hamlet for "Moral Rights" in the
U.S., 14 U.C.D. L. Rev. 975 (1981); Note, Artworks and American Law: The California Art
Preservation Act, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 1201 (1981).
169. For example, the Copyright Act gives a performance right to a literary or dramatic
work, but not to a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work. If, for example, the program of modern
dance presented during the photo-realist exhibition contained several "tableaux vivants" of
copyrighted paintings, these would arguably be performances of the pictorial works and there-
fore there would be no infringement of the copyright owner's exclusive rights. However, the
background projections of changing slide images would constitute a display of these pictorial
works and permission of the copyright owner would be necessary.
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The museum must accordingly take into account both exclusive
rights and their limitations to avoid problems of infringement,170
while making use of works to their fullest extent.
8.2 The Reproduction Right
The right to reproduce the copyrighted work is in some ways the
most basic of the exclusive rights. The reproduction right is infringed
when an author's work is placed without his consent in a tangible
form in a material object.' 71 It makes no difference that the work is
reproduced in a photograph; infringement may occur even though a
different medium and dimension are involved. 172 Similarly, one may
infringe the reproduction right by making an unauthorized recording
of a literary work in book form or a transcript of a musical work on
sheet music from a tape recording. For infringement to occur,the
copying does not have to be verbatim, as long as it is substantially
similar to the copyrighted work. 73
8.3 Limitations on the Reproduction Right: Library Photocopying
The reproduction right is subject to important limitations which
may apply to a museum which operates a library or archive open to
170.
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive right of the copyright owner as provided by
sections 106 through 118, . . . is an infringer of the copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982).
171.
[A] copyrighted work would be infringed by reproducing it in whole or in any
substantial part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or simulation.
H.R. Report at 61.
172. See, e.g., King Features Syndicate v. Fleisher, 299 Fed. 533 (2d Cir. 1924) (toys based on
copyrighted cartoons); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)(sketches based on photograph); Habersham Plantation Corp. v. Country Concepts, 209
U.S.P.Q. 711 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (line drawings based on photographs). This same principle is true
for infringement of derivative works. See, e.g., Eden Toys v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697
F.2d 27, 35 (2d Cir. 1982) ("No one may copy another's novel additions in a derivative work,
even if the copier employs a medium different from that used by the holder of the derivative
copyright." The unauthorized use of photographers' images in paintings has been the subject of
some controversy. See Morris, When Artists Use Photographs: Is It Fair Use, Legitimate Trans-
formation or Rip-Off?, 80 Art News 102 (Jan. 1981).
173.
Wide departures or variations from the copyrighted works would still be an infringe-
ment as long as the author's 'expression' rather than merely the author's 'ideas' are
taken.
H.R. Report at 61.
For discussion of what constitutes "substantial similarity," see infra note 270 and accompany-
ing text.
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the general public or researcher in a specialized field of interest.17 4
This exception to the reproduction right provides that under certain
circumstances, a library open to the public may qualify for the privi-
lege of reproducing and distributing one copy of a work without
infringing copyright. The library must make the distribution without
any purpose of direct or indirect commercial gain and the reproduc-
tion must bear copyright notice.17 5 The library can make no more
than one copy or phono-record of the work at a time, thus precluding
systematic reproduction and distribution activities. Consequently, the
museum library could send a photocopy of an article in a journal or a
reprint to a researcher without infringing copyright if the above pro-
visions were followed. Significantly, the library's right to reproduce
does not extend to musical works, pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
works except those appearing as illustrations, or to certain kinds of
audio-visual works.
176
The provisions apply to library photocopying for a patron's use of a
work. Other provisions relate to the library's own use of a work; the
current Act allows the library to reproduce an unpublished work for
archival preservation and to reproduce a published work for replace-
ment which has been damaged, lost, stolen, or is deteriorating. 177 The
174. See generally Treece, Library Photocopying, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1025 (1977); Young,
Copyright and the New Technologies-The Case of Library Photocopying, 28 Copyright L.
Symp. (ASCAP) 51 (1982). Written principally for librarians are: J. Miller, Applying the New
Copyright Law: A Guide for Educators and Librarians (1979) and Copyright Office Circular
R21, Reproduction of Copyrighted Works by Educators and Librarians.
175.
[It is not an infringement of copyright for a library or archives, or any of its
employees acting within the scope of their employment, to reproduce no more than
one copy or phonorecord of a work, or to distribute such copy or phonorecord, under
the conditions specified by this section, if-
(1) the reproduction or distribution is made without any purpose of direct or indirect
commercial advantage;
(2) the collections of the library or archives are (i) open to the public, or (ii) available
not only to researchers affiliated with the library or archives or with the institution
of which it is a part, but also to other persons doing research in a specialized field;
and
(3) the reproduction or distribution of the work includes a notice of copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1982).
Section 108(e) requires that the library display warnings of copyright in accordance with the
prescribed regulations. The text of the warning appears in 37 C.F.R. § 201.14(b) (1982). Section
108(i) requires that the Register of Copyrights report every five years to Congress concerning this
library photocopy. The latest report, Library Reproduction of Copyrighted Works, was submit-
ted to Congress in January, 1983. 25 Pat., Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 229 (1983).
176. 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (1982). It would appear that a museum library would be prohibited
under this section from copying a full-page reproduction, e.g., a drawing reproduced in a
catalogue raisonnee, but it could photocopy a page in which an illustration accompanied
explanatory text.
177. 17 U.S.C. § 108(c) (1982).
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replacement privilege for published works applies only if the library
cannot obtain the work at a fair price after making a reasonable
effort. 17 8
8.4 The Adaptation Right
The adaptation right, 179 or the right to make derivative works, is
related to the reproduction and performance rights. The adaptation
right is infringed when one makes an unauthorized derivative work.
Examples include art reproductions, translations, musical arrange-
ments, dramatizations or any other mode by which a preexisting work
is recast, transformed or adapted.18 0 The standard for infringement,
as in any copyright case, is one of substantial similarity. 181 Thus, if one
were to write a play based on a novel and the play substantially
embodied the novel, the copyright owner could bring an action for the
infringement of the adaptation and reproduction right. If the play
were performed, the performance right, as well as the other two
rights, would be infringed. The exclusive rights in many cases thus
overlap and the infringement of the adaptation right almost invari-
ably involves infringement of the reproduction right, performance
right, 82 or both.
There is one instance where the adaptation right alone is subject to
infringement. This may occur when the copyright owner has licensed
another to reproduce or perform the copyrighted work, but has not
178.
The scope and nature of a reasonable investigation to determine that an unused
replacement cannot be obtained will vary according to the circumstances of a particu-
lar situation. It will always require recourse to commonly known trade sources in the
United States, and in the normal situation to the publisher or other copyright owner (if
such owner can be located at the address listed in the copyright registration), or an
authorized reproducing service.
H.R. Report at 75-76.
179. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
180. For discussion of copyrightability of derivative works, see supra notes 64-76 and accom-
panying text.
181. See infra note 270.
To be an infringement the 'derivative work' must be 'based upon the copyrighted work
. .. . Thus, to constitute a violation of section 106(2), the infringing work must
incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form.
H.R. Report at 62.
182.
The exclusive right to prepare derivative works . . . overlaps the exclusive right of
reproduction to some extent. It is broader than the right, however, in the sense that
reproduction requires fixation in copies or phonorecords, whereas the preparation of a
derivative work, such as a ballet, pantomime, or improvised performance, may be an
infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form.
H.R. Report at 62.
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specifically licensed the right to make derivative works. 18 3 For exam-
ple, a museum may have acquired the right to reproduce a copy-
righted painting; but what if the museum reproduces only part of the
painting, including it as a full-page detail in an engagement calendar
or cookbook? 184 Here, many courts would likely construe the contract
narrowly and find the museum to have infringed the adaptation right
because it was specifically granted the reproduction right only and no
more. Thus, the museum should expressly acquire the adaptation
right depending upon the uses it wishes to make of a copyrighted
work.
8.5 The Distribution Right
The third exclusive right enumerated by the Copyright Act is the
distribution right.1 85 By the distribution right, the copyright owner
has the right to control the first public distribution of the work either
by sale, gift, loan, or rental. The distribution right is often infringed
along with other exclusive rights, most often the reproduction right.
Such would occur if one were to make and sell unauthorized prints of
a work of art. Sometimes the infringement of the distribution right
may occur alone. This type of infringement arises most commonly in
the record and music industry when pirated records or video cassettes
acquired from a third party are sold at retail. Although the retail
seller may not know that the works were improperly made, they
would still be infringing the distribution right by selling the pirated
copies. 86 As in all cases of infringement, innocence is no defense.
18 7
183. The leading case is Gilliam v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976)
(holding that American Broadcasting Company, which received a license to show Monty Python
films, had infringed the copyright held by that group when they edited them for broadcast).
One who obtains permission to use a copyrighted script in the production of a
derivative work, however, may not exceed the specific purpose for which permission
was granted .... Whether intended to allow greater economic exploitation of the
work. . . or to ensure that the copyright proprietor retains a veto power over revisions
desired for the derivative work, the ability of the copyright holder to control his work
remains paramount in our copyright law.
Id. at 20-21. See also Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee, 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Texas 1980)
(holding that licensee infringed copyright of plaintiff, columnist Heloise, by inserting advertise-
ments for their products in her books).
184. Many museums publish calendars from cookbooks, illustrated with works from their
collections. See, e.g., Grove, Museum Cookbooks: For Fun and Profit, 53 Museum News 52
(June 1975). The illustrations are often appropriate details from paintings, to complement the
theme of the book, e.g., flowers or food.
185. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1982).
186.
[A]ny resale of an illegally "pirated" phonorecord would be an infringement . ...
H.R. Report at 79.
187. Innocent intent, although relevant to questions of remedy, will not be a defense to
actions for statutory copyright infringement. See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283
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Similarly, the museum could infringe the distribution right if it sold
posters, postcards, or sculpture reproduced without authorization
from the copyright owner. Infringement would occur even though the
objects were bought from a third party and innocently sold without
the museum knowing the circumstances of reproduction. 88
8.6 Limitations on the Distribution Right: The First-Sale Doctrine
A basic exception to the distribution right is known as the first-sale
doctrine. This limitation on the distribution right authorizes the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord, which has been lawfully
made, to sell or otherwise dispose of its possession.189 Thus a museum
which owns a work of art may resell it to another as long as it was
bought from an individual who had lawful ownership. Of course
ownership of the copy of the work does not include ownership of the
copyright in the work itself. The first-sale doctrine therefore applies
only to the right to resell the work and not to exploit it in any other
U.S. 191, 198 (1930) ("Intention to infringe is not essential under the Act"); Platt & Munk Co. v.
Playmore, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); and Plymouth Music Co. v. Magnus Organ
Corp., 456 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
"[A] plea of innocence in a copyright action may often be easy to claim and difficult to
disaprove .... Copyright would lose much of its value if third parties such as publishers and
producers were insulated from liability because of their innocence as to the culpability of the
persons who supplied them with the infringing material" (footnotes omitted). 3 Nimmer, § 13.08
at 13-110. Innocent intent is a defense to charges of criminal infringement, which, of course,
requires culpable mens rea. See infra note 274.
188. For cost-sharing reasons primarily, many of the temporary exhibitions at museums today
are traveling ones, organized by one or perhaps more institutions and shown at several. The
organizing museum often prepares materials such as exhibition catalogues, posters, postcards,
etc. to be sold at each participating museum. While museums often pay careful attention to
copyright questions involved in loans of works of art, little regard is given to possible copyright
infringements in the material sold during the traveling exhibition, perhaps in the mistaken belief
that any infringement would be the problem of the organizing museum and not the "innocent
third party."
189.
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner,
is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
(c) The privileges prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) do not, unless authorized by the
copyright owner, extend to any person who has acquired possession of the copy or
phonorecord from the copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without
acquiring ownership of it.
17 U.S.C. § 109(a), (c) (1982).
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way, except perhaps to display the work under certain circumstances
as will be later discussed. 19 0
The first-sale doctrine allows the copyright owner the privilege of
making a profit on the first sale of his work, but not on a further resale
or rental of the work. As it applies to artists, this doctrine reveals a
particularly American notion about the ownership of tangible prop-
erty. By comparison, countries such as France and Germany allow the
artist to recover a portion of the profit from the resale of a work as it
passes from owner to owner. 191 Influenced by the European experi-
ence and responding to pressure from artists rights' groups, in 1976
California passed a Resale Royalties Act which allowed an artist to
recover 5 % of the total price payable for the sale of his pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work sold for more than $1,000.192 For the
Reslae Royalties Act to apply, the resale must, however, occur in
California. If the resale occurs elsewhere, the seller must be a resident
of California at the time of sale. 193 Thus the museum may have to
consider the California act when acquiring a work of art in California
or from a California resident. Because of its narrow scope, the Cali-
fornia Resale Royalties Act will have limited application, 19 4 but it may
190.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5), the owner of a particular copy
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled,
without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly, either
directly or by the projection of no more than one image at a time, to viewers present at
the place where the copy is located.
17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1982). See infra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
191. For discussion of resale royalties rights abroad, see, e.g., Sherman, Incorporation of the
Droit de Suite Into United States Copyright Law, 18 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 50 (1970);
Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de Suite and a Proposed Enactment for the
United States, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 19 (1966); Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of
Protection for the Underprivileged Artist under the Copyright Law, 11 Copyright L. Symp.
(ASCAP) 1 (1962); and Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of
The Droit de Suite, 77 Yale L.J. 1333 (1968).
192. Cal. Civ. Code § 986 (West Supp. 1980).
193. The Act has been widely criticized as benefitting only a few artists, those with a
secondary market (not the great majority of artists); as being in reality a sales tax which will
reduce the amount of money which museums and collectors would spend on art; as a psychologi-
cal barrier to the purchase of art; and as the creator of uneconomic administrative burdens. See,
Ashley, Critical Comment on California's Droit de Suite, Civil Code Section 986, 29 Hastings
L.J. 249 (1977); Elsen, California Artist's Resale Law: Failure of Innocence, 65 Art In America
15 (Mar.-April 1977); and Bolch, Damon and Hinshaw, An Economic Analysis of the California
Art Royalty Statute, 10 Conn. L. Rev. 689 (1978).
194. The Act has also been questioned regarding preemption by federal copyright law. See,
e.g., 2 Nimmer, § 8.22[B] (1981); Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of
1976: The Case of Droit de Suite, 47 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 200 (1978). In 1980, applying the
Copyright Act of 1909, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitution-
ality of the Act. Morsburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983
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be representative of a general movement to depart from the strictures
of the first-sale doctrine.
8.7 The Performance Right
The performance right is perhaps the most complex of the exclusive
rights.19 5 The three rights previously discussed, reproduction, adapta-
tion, and distribution, apply to all varieties of copyrightable subject
matter, whereas the performance right does not apply to pictorial,
graphic or sculptural works or sound recordings. In addition, the
performance right is further complicated by an elaborate set of limita-
tions much more extensive than the other rights.19 6
Even though the performance right does not apply to pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work, the museum as a center for general
culture and education must concern itself with this right. The mu-
seum may have a concert series where music, dramatic, choreo-
graphic, or audiovisual works are performed, all of which are subject
to the performance right. 9 7 Museum classrooms where art history and
other subjects are taught also may involve the public performance of
copyrighted works. Background music may be used to enhance the
ambiance of an exhibition.
As a general proposition, all public performances, even those given
by a non-profit museum, are subject to the performance right; 9 8 but
this general proposition is qualified. The Copyright Act attempts to
balance the needs of educators and other non-profit users of copy-
(1980). For an analysis of the 1976 Copyright Act as applied to the California Act, see Note, The
California Resale Royalties Act as a Test Case for Preemption Under the 1976 Copyright Law, 81
Colum. L. Rev. 1315 (1981).
195. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
To perform or display a work "publicly" means-
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
196. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1982). See also infra notes 200-13 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 195.
198. A copyright owner's performance rights under the 1909 Act were limited to "for profit"
performances. 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1909) (superseded 1976).
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righted works by setting forth a complicated set of provisions limiting
the performance right.-9
8.8 The Face-to-Face Teaching Exemption
One far-ranging limitation on the performance right exempts copy-
right liability for the performance and display of all types of copy-
righted works by instructors or pupils in the course of the face-to-face
teaching activities in a non-profit educational institution, in a class-
room or similar place devoted to instruction.
00 This exemption would
apply, for example, to an instructor in a museum who teaches an art
history class and shows an audio-visual work to his students or to
students who act out a drama in front of the class.
This face-to-face teaching exemption is narrowly drawn. First,
face-to-face teaching activities do not include broadcasts. Thus, if the
audio-visual work accompanying the photo-realist exhibition were
broadcast by closed circuit television from the museum to another
location, the exemption would not apply.
20
' Second, instructional
activities do not include performances given for recreation or enter-
tainment. Third, the museum school could bring in guest lecturers,
but the exemption does not apply to performances by paid actors
brought in from the outside.202 Fourth, the teaching activities must
199.
The line between commercial and "non-profit" organizations is increasingly difficult
to draw. Many "non-profit" organizations are highly subsidized and capable of paying
royalties, and the widespread public explotation of copyrighted works by public
broadcasters and other noncommercial organizations is likely to grow.
H.R. Report at 62-63.
200.
The following are not infringements of copyright:
(1) performance or display of a work by instructors or pupils in the course of face-to-
face teaching activities of a non-profit educational institution, in a classroom or
similar place devoted to instruction, unless, in the case of a motion picture or other
audio-visual work, the performance, or the display of individual images, is given
by means of a copy that was not lawfully made under this title, and that the
person responsible for the performance knew or had reason to believe was not
lawfully made; . ...
17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (1982). See also H.R. Report, at 81-82.
201.
The concept does not require that the teacher and students be able to see each other,
although it does require their simultaneous presence in the same general place. Use of
the phrase "in the course of face-to-face teaching activities" is intended to exclude
broadcasting or other transmissions from an outside location into classrooms, whether
radio or television and whether open or closed circuit.
H.R. Report at 81.
202. H.R. Report at 82.
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take place in a classroom or similar place devoted to instruction,
including a large auditorium. The teaching in that place must, how-
ever, actually be used as a classroom for systematic instructional
activities and the audience must be comprised of the members of the
class. This appears to exclude a museum lecture series open to the
public and not directed to members enrolled in a specific course. 203
8.9 The Broadcast Teaching Exemption
The previous exemption covered performances in a face-to-face
teaching situation. The Copyright Act also exempts certain teaching
activities of a transmission or broadcast, but in much more narrow
circumstances. 2 4 This exemption to the performance right would al-low an educational broadcast of a non-dramatic literary or musical
work if the broadcast is a regular part of a systematic non-profit
instructional activity. 205 The broadcast must be directed to classrooms
or similar places normally devoted to instruction. 206 Here the museum
could broadcast over educational television a reading from a literary
text, but could not perform a play or show a motion picture without
the copyright owner's permission. 201
8.10 Face-to-Face Non-Instructional Performances by
Non-Profit Institutions
The above exceptions to the performance right concern teaching
and instructional activities. But what of a performance given to thepublic who are not attending as students? As, for example, the pro-gram of modern dance presented during the photo-realist exhibition?
The Copyright Act exempts an unauthorized non-broadcasted per-
formance of a non-dramatic literary or musical work in a narrow and
complex set of circumstances. 208 The performance must truly be a
203. For example, beginning in 1982, the National Endowment for the Humanities has
awarded grants for "Learning Museums Programs" aimed at adult audiences and consisting of
sequential series of lectures integrating several humanities disciplines. Parks, NEH Learning
Museum Programs, Museums, Adults and The Humanities at 203 (1981).
The use of audio-visual materials in such a series, which the lecturer knew or had reason toknow were made without the authorization of the copyright owner, would appear not to come
under the exemptions of § 101.
204. 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (1982).
205. 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(A) (1982).
206. 17 U.S.C. § 110(2)(C) (1982).
207. H.R. Report at 83.
208. 17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (1982).
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non-profit performance. There can be no admission charge, 20
9 or if
there is, all profits must go to educational, religious or charitable
purposes. 210 Moreover, no compensation can be paid to a performer,
producer or promotor. Thus, even a free concert will constitute copy-
right infringement if the performer receives any payment other than
reimbursement for expenses.
The privilege for performing certain works face-to-face in a non-
profit setting is subject to an interesting variation: this occurs if an
admission is charged. Here it is possible for the copyright owner to
stop the performance by "notice of objection" to the performance at
least one week before the performance is to take place. 2 
1 The institu-
tion, however, has no duty to inform the copyright owner that the
performance will take place. The copyright owner must somehow
find out about the performance and follow the prescribed procedures
within the required time limits. Despite the possibility of notice of
objection, it is unlikely that many copyright owners will take these
necesssary steps except in cases of the most highly publicized perform-
ances.
8.11 Public Receptions of Performance
The final exception to the performance right concerns a narrow
privilege to receive a transmission on a radio or television for retrans-
mission.2 12 The Copyright Act allows small commercial establish-
ments to use on their premises standard radio or television equipment
for the enjoyment of their customers, such as the ubiquitious television
in the neighborhood bar. This exception to the performance right does
not apply to commercial sound systems more elaborate than those
used by private persons. The drafters of the Copyright Act considered
such performances de minimis, but when the apparatus becomes
larger, then the performance is more extensively disseminated and the
performance right is placed in jeopardy.2 13 Thus the museum should
not adopt the practice of receiving music over a sound system and
simultaneously transmitting it to several rooms. Such could constitute
infringement of the performance right.
209. 17 U.S.C. § 110(4)(A) (1982). The statute specifies that there must be no direct or
indirect admission charge.
210. 17 U.S.C. § 110(4)(B) (1982).
211. 17 U.S.C. § 110(4)(B)(i), (ii) (1982).
212. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1982).
213.
The basic rationale of this clause is that the secondary use of the transmission by
turning on an ordinary receiver in public is so remote and minimal that no further
1984]
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8.12 The Display Right
The right to display 14 the copyrighted work has obvious impor-
tance to anyone involved in the visual arts. As in the performance
right, the display right only involves public display of the work and is
subject to some of the same educational limitations as the performance
right discussed in the previous section.215 To display a work is to show
a copy of it directly or by a device. A motion picture, for example, is
displayed when frames are shown non-sequentially; when shown in
sequence, however, the motion picture is considered performed. 216
8.13 Limitations on the Display Right
One limitation to the display right, apart from the face-to-face
teaching exemption, is closely related to the first-sale doctrine. 217 This
allows the owner of a lawfully made copy of a work to display it
directly or by projection of no more than one image at a time to
viewers present at the place where the copy is located.21 s Thus if the
museum owns a painting, even if it does not own the copyright on the
painting, it may show the painting to the public directly or by projec-
tion, as long as the display takes place on museum grounds and is not
further projected to distant locations.
The privilege to display or to authorize others to display the copy
applies only to those who own the work. Therefore the museum which
is lent a painting may only display it at the museum and cannot
liability should be imposed. In the vast majority of these cases no royalties are
collected today, and the exemption should be made explicit in the statute. This clause
has nothing to do with cable television systems and the exemptions would be denied in
any case where the audience is charged directly to see or hear the transmission.
H.R. Report at 86. The discussion of cable television, because of its technical legal complexity, is
beyond the scope of this article. See generally, M. Hamburg, All About Cable (1981); Rosenthal,
Copyright Owners vs. Cable Television: The Evolution of a Copyright Liability Conflict, 33 Syr.
L. Rev. 693 (1982).
214. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). The right to display is codified for the first time in the 1976 Act.
H.R. Report at 63.
215. See supra notes 195-213 and accompanying text.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
216. According to § 101 of the Act:
To "display" a work means to show a copy of it, either directly or by means of a film,
slide, television image, or any other device or process or, in the case of a motion
picture or other audio-visual work, to show individual images nonsequentially.
According to the House Report:
Since "copies" are defined as including the material object "in which the work is first
fixed," the right of public display applies to original works of art as well as to
reproductions of them.
H.R. Report at 64.
217. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
218. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1982).
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authorize others to display it. Of course the right to display does not
include any other use of the painting, such as reproduction in an
exhibition catalogue. 219  Here the museum must acquire permission
from the copyright owner if it wishes to reproduce a work given to it
on loan from another person or museum, even though the third party
may own the copy of the work.220 Of course if the lender owns the
copyright as well as the copy, no such complications will arise.
9. OWNERSHIP
Copyright ownership initially vests in the author of the work, who
is given as copyright owner a bundle of rights known as the exclusive
rights. 22' The exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, distribu-
tion, performance and display set forth the boundaries of copyright
ownership, specifying what constitutes infringement on the one hand
and how the copyright owner can economically exploit his property
on the other.
9.1 Divisibility of Ownership
The current Copyright Act recognizes the principle of divisibility
which allows the copyright owner to split up his ownership in an
infinite number of ways by sale, gift or lease. 222 For example, the
219. The House Report, in its discussion of § 109(b), raises the question of the right of an
artist, who has sold a painting, but not the copyright, to restrain the new owner from displaying
the work of art publicly for example in galleries. The drafters answer the question by stating that
§ 109(b) adopts the general principle that the lawful owner should be able to put his copy on
public display without the consent of the copyright owner. If, however, they would contract to
the contrary, this would appear to be enforceable. H.R. Report at 79.
This limitation on the right of display is limited to viewers "present at the place where the
copy is located." Nimmer, pointing out some ambiguities in the language of the exception, asks:
"If viewers observe a painting projected on a screen in one room of a large museum, while the
'copy' being projected is in another room at the opposite end of the museum, are the viewers
Ipresent at the place where the copy is located'?" Referring to this House Report discussion of the
place located as "a situation in which viewers are present in the same physical surrounding as the
copy, even though they cannot see the copy directly" (H.R. Report at 80), Nimmer concludes
that this museum display would fall within the exception. 2 Nimmer § 8.20[B] at 8-244.
220. This is true whether the museum is the owner of the work but does not own the
copyright, is lent the work by an owner who does not own the copyright, or is lent the work by
an owner who does own the copyright, but is authorizing nothing more than display. The
drafters of the act were concerned that the exception to the right of display not affect the
copyright owner's market for reproduction and distribution of copies. H.R. Report at 80.
221. 217 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982).
222.
(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means
of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as
personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.
(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of
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copyright owner of a sculpture may sell the right of reproduction and
distribution to a publishing company while retaining the right of
adaptation for himself and, at the same time, give an exclusive license
for the display of his work to a museum for one year. Each of these
transferees now becomes owner of a copyright interest along with the
original author and, unless there is a limitation placed on the transfer,
the new owner of the copyright interest can further sell or lease his
interest in the work. In addition, he may also bring copyright in-
fringement actions in his own name against those who are improperly
using his property right. 223
Although desirable, it may not always be possible for the museum
to acquire the full copyright along with the work of art. If not, the
museum at the least should negotiate an assignment or license autho-
rizing the specific use it wishes to make of the work, e.g., reproduc-
tion for purposes of publicity and education. We now turn to the
manner in which copyright interests are transferred.
9.2 Assignments and Licenses
One must distinguish among the several ways in which the copy-
right owner may exploit his copyright interest. The entire copyright
interest might be assigned to another who now becomes the copyright
owner. Similarly, the copyright owner can also assign his interest in
one or more of the exclusive rights, such as the reproduction and
performance rights, while either retaining some rights for himself or
selling or leasing them to others. The copyright owner can also convey
less than a complete ownership interest in a work. Such a transfer is
called a license which is either an exclusive license, if the licensor
any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1)
and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the
extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright
owner by this title.
17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1982). This is the first statutory recognitionof the principle of divisibility of
copyright. "This provision means that any of the exclusive rights that go to make up a copyright
. . . can be transferred and owned separately." H.R. Report at 123. See generally Kaminstein,
Divisibility of Copyrights, Study No. 11 in 1 Studies in Copyright at 623 (Arthur Fisher Mem.
Ed. 1963). See also Note, Divisibility of Copyright : Its Application and Effect, 19 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 171 (1979); Note, Divisibility of Copyright: A Bill of Rights for Authors, 14 Cal. W.L.
Rev. 590 (1979).
223.
It is thus clear, for example, that a local broadcasting station holding an exclusive
license to transmit a particular work within a particular geographic area and for a
particular period of time, could sue, in its own name as copyright owner, someone
who infringed that particular exclusive right.
H.R. Report at 123.
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agrees not to give the same right to someone else, or a nonexclusive
license, if the licensor retains the right to license the same rights to
others.2 2 4 For example, a museum as the copyright owner may license
a publisher the right to reproduce the work in a poster to be sold in
certain retail outlets only during a five-year period. By an exclusive
license, the museum would agree not to give another the same right.2 25
The distinction between assignments and exclusive licenses on the
one hand and non-exclusive licenses on the other is important. Assign-
ments and exclusive licenses are considered transfers of copyright226
and under the Copyright Act, to be effective, must be manifested in a
signed writing.2 27 Alternatively, non-exclusive licenses can be con-
veyed orally as informally as an agreement over the telephone. Never-
theless, it is highly recommended that one effect a written document
for all assignments or licenses.2 28
What form should the writing take? Just about any format will
suffice, such as a letter stating the terms of the assignment or license.
The written agreement should explicitly set forth the royalty provi-
sions, the length of the time of the conveyance, the circumstances of
termination, if any, the name to be carried on the notice of copyright,
and the responsibilities for maintaining an infringement suit against
third parties.22 9
224. See generally 3 Nimmer, §§ 10.01-10.15 (Assignments, Licenses, and Other Transfers of
Rights).
225. Museum licensing arrangements with manufacturers for the production of goods based
on works of art in the collection and to be carried in its own and other stores, as well as by mail-
order catalogues, can be a lucrative source of revenue for the museum. These products can. range
from traditional items such as greeting cards and posters, to tee-shirts, bed linens and needle-
point canvasses. See generally Hodes & Gross, Museums in the Commercial Marketplace: The
Need for Licensing Agreements, 10 Conn. L. Rev. 620 (1978), [hereinafter cited as Hodes &
Gross]; and Faul, Licensing Programs-A Second Life for Museum Collections, 54 Museum
News 26 (Nov.-Dec., 1975).
226.
A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an asignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or
any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place
of effect, but not including a non-exclusive license.
17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1982).
227. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1982).
228. One reason for this recommendation is that it may not be clear whether a particular
agreement is an exclusive or non-exclusive license. See, e.g., Library Publications v. Medical
Economies, 548 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. Pa. 1982), where plaintiff had alleged breach of non-
exclusive license to distribute a book published by the defendant, the court held the license was
exclusive and as such, invalid as it was not in writing.)
229. Strong, The Copyright Book: A Practical Guide (1981) at 41-42. For a sample licensing
agreement drafted specifically for museums, see "Model Museum Licensing Agreement," Appen-
dix A in Hodes & Gross, supra note 225, at 631. This agreement includes sections on manner of
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9.3 Recordation and Ownership Priorities
For a nominal fee the Copyright Act permits recordation of all
documents pertaining to copyright ownership no matter what their
form.2 30 The museum should make use of this privilege for all impor-
tant transfer documents, whether assignments, exclusive licenses, or
non-exclusive licenses. Recordation, specifically identifying the work,
will give notice to the world of the facts set forth in the recorded
documents. This means that even if a third party did not have actual
notice of the document, he is presumed to have had that informa-
tion. 231 This important constructive notice aspect of recordation ap-
plies only if the underlying work is registered. 232 For optimum effec-
tiveness, recordation should accompany registration.
Perhaps the most important aspect of recordation is that it estab-
lishes priority of ownership. 233 Suppose, for example, that the artist
conveyed to the museum the copyright on the photo-realist painting in
December, 1983, and then conveyed the copyright on the same paint-
ing to a third party in January, 1984. The museum, as first transferee,
under the terms of the Copyright Act, is allowed a grace period of one
month (two months if the agreement was executed outside the county)
to record the work in the Copyright Office. 234 When the one-month
grace period terminates, it then becomes a race between the two
reproduction and quality control directed to particular museum concerns with the safety of their
valuable works of art and with the quality of resulting products. The objects produced by license
reflect the quality of the original work and also reflect the museum's aesthetic reputation.
230.
Any transfer of copyright ownership or other document pertaining to copyright may
be recorded in the Copyright Office ....
17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1982).
See, 37 C.F.R. § 201.4 (1982) for regulation of the Copyright Office pertaining to the
recordation of transfers.
231.
Recordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all persons constructive
notice of the facts stated in the recorded document .
17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1982).
232. 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1982).
233.
As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first prevails if it is recorded, in
the manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c), within one
month after its execution, in the United States or within two months after its execution
outside the United States, or at any time before recordation in such manner of the later
transfer. Otherwise the later transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner, and if
taken in good faith, for valuable consideration or on the basis of a binding promise to
pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier transfer.
17 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1982).
234. Id.
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transferees to record, and if the museum is last to record, it will be
deprived of its ownership right. The museum may still possibly obtain
damages against the artist on the contract, but it has lost its chance to
own the copyright in the painting. Note that these priority provisions
apply only if the work, in this case the painting, was registered in
addition to the recordation of the document. If no one has registered
the work, these statutory priority provisions will not apply and the
court will decide priority on proof submitted by the parties.
There are two exceptions to the above priority rules. First, priority
will not be given to one who has received a transfer in bad faith, 23 5 as
for example, to someone who actually knows about the prior transfer.
The second major exception concerns a transfer not involving valuable
consideration such as a gift or bequest. 236 In these two situations the
later transferee will not prevail over the first, even if he records in the
proper manner. Later transferees, even if they are first to record, who
recieve an ownership right either in bad faith or for nothing cannot
therefore prevail over a prior transferee.
Prompt registration and recordation is also important in ownership
rights between a first transferee, assignee or exclusive licensee and
later a non-exclusive licensee. For example, suppose the artist transfer-
red the entire copyright to the photo-realist painting to a museum, but
then gave a third party a non-exclusive license for reproduction and
distribution. Here, the non-exclusive license would continue to be
effective despite the transfer to the museum if it is evidenced by a
written agreement signed by the artist and if the license were taken in
good faith before recordation of the transfer.237 Thus, the museum
which neglected to record the transfer would own the copyright, but
could do nothing to prevent the non-exclusive licensee from continu-
ing to reproduce and distribute the work.
9.4 Recordation as a Prerequisite to Infringement Suit
Both registration and recordation are prerequisites to infringement
suits. To prevent another from using the copyrighted work, a copy-
235. Id.
236. Id.
237.
A non-exclusive license, whether recorded or not, prevails over a conflicting transfer of
copyright ownership if the license is evidenced by a written instrument signed by the
owner of the rights licensed or such owner's duly authorized agent, and if-
(1) the license was taken before execution of the transfer; or
(2) the license was taken in good faith before recordation of the transfer and without
notice of it.
17 U.S.C. § 205(f) (1982).
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right owner must first register the work and record the transfer. 238
Sometimes the work will already have been registered and all that
need be done is to record the transfer. Just as often, particularly in the
art world, many copyright owners have failed to take advantage of
registration. Thus if the museum enters into an agreement to transfer
copyright, it should check the records in the Copyright Office for
evidence of registration and recordation of other grants covering the
copyrighted work.239
The museum should therefore, no more than one month after exe-
cution of the transfer document, make certain that the document is
recorded in the Copyright Office. Because registration is a prereq-
uisite to effective recordation, the museum may have to file simultane-
ously for registration as well. Again, there is a need for procedures
within the museum to administer these simple ownership formalities
which play such an important role in establishing one's effective rights
in a copyrighted work.
9.5 Works Made for Hire
Having discussed the ways in which an owner of copyright can
exploit his ownership in a work, we now turn to the question of who is
an author. In general, the source of ownership is the author of the
work, its maker or originator. Many works, however, are not created
by an individual privately, but are motivated by an employer pursu-
ant to employment duties or created on commission. In our opening
example the curator of contemporary art has written a contribution to
the photo-realist exhibition catalogue. Other staff have developed an
audio-visual program to accompany the exhibition. Works like these,
created in the course of one's employment, are called works made for
hire. 240 Here, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise, own-
ership vests in the employer who is considered the author. 241
238.
No person claiming by virtue of a transfer to be the owner of copyright or of any
exclusive right under a copyright is entitled to institute an infringement action under
this title until the instrument of transfer under which such person claims has been
recorded in the Copyright Office, but suit may be instituted after such recordation on
a cause bf action that arose before recordation.
17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1982).
239. See supra note 106 relating to search of records at the Copyright Office.
240. For definition, see supra note 132 and accompanying text. See generally O'Meara, Works
Made "For Hire" Under The Copyright Act of 1976-Two Interpretations, 15 Creighton L. Rev.
523 (1981-82); Angel & Tannenbaum, Works Made For Hire Under S.22, 22 N.Y. L. Rev. 209
(1976). See also Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They 'Works Made for Hire' Under the 1976
Copyright Act, 9 J. of Coll. and U.L. 485 (1982-83).
241. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982). For legislative history of this section, see H.R. Report at 121.
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Other works, such as the critical essays written by outside scholars
and the special dance program, were created on commission. As will
be discussed, only certain categories of commissioned works qualify as
"works made for hire." A work made for hire differs from other works
in several important ways. First, the employer need do nothing to
secure ownership of the work; the employer should simply register the
work in its own name.242 Second, the duration for a work made for
hire differs from other works. 243 Instead of the life of the author plus
fifty years, the term for a work made for hire is seventy-five years
from publication or 100 years from creation, whichever is shorter.
244
Third, a work made for hire is not subject to termination rights as are
other works. 245
How does one decide whether a work has been created in the scope
of employment? For example, what of a curator who works at home
on a catalogue covering an aspect of the museum's collection or on an
article for a journal?246 This question is often more difficult to answer
in practical situations, that is, the standard is more easily stated than
applied. A work created within the employment relationship is one
created at the insistence and expense of the employer. Close factual
questions arise in construing this standard and actual cases turn on
such elements as whether the employee was creating something re-
lated to his employment duties, 247 whether the employer had the right
to direct and supervise his work, 248 and whether the employer was the
242. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1982). Moreover, a statement to the effect that the work is a work made
for hire must be included in the application for copyright registration. 17 U.S.C. § 409(4) (1982).
243. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1982).
244. Id.
245. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982), regarding termination of transfer. It states, "In the case of
any work other than a work made for hire ....
246. The benefits of publication for museum personnel are many: enhanced professional
reputation, dissemination of scholarly ideas, even fees or royalties. As long as the practices of
museums in this area are varied, and the law is unclear, it is advisable for a museum to
promulgate written guidelines concerning staff writings. This is recommended by the Code of
Ethics of the American Association of Museums (1978). For a review of the questions to be
considered in such a policy and an articulate argument that it would ultimately aid museums in
attracting and retaining highly qualified staff to allow them to keep proprietary and copyright
interests in their writings, see Knoll & Drapiewski, "Knowing Your Copyrights," 55 Museum
News 49 (Mar.-April 1977).
247. See, e.g., Public Affairs Assoc. v. Rickover, 268 F. Supp. 444 (D.C. 1967) (speeches
delivered by Admiral Rickover held to be his private property for which he might obtain the
copyright. The court emphasized that the invations were delivered to him directly, were pre-
pared on his own time and concerned a subject removed from this official duties.), on remand
from the U.S. Supreme Court, 369 U.S. 111 (1961).
248. See, e.g., Donaldson Publishing Co. v. Bregman, Vocco and Conn., Inc. 375 F.2d 639
(2d Cir. 1967); Olympia Press v. Lancer Books, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); and
Aitken v. Empire Construction Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982) (holding for architect as
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motivating factor in the creation of the work.2 49 If the above factors
are present the law establishes a presumption that the work is a work
made for hire, with initial ownership vesting in the employer. 250 To
reverse the presumption, the employer and employee may, by written
contract, agree otherwise. 25' But note that the contrary is not true; if a
work is not created in the scope of employment, the parties cannot
agree to characterize the work as one for hire. In such cases the
museum would have to seek a formal written assignment of the work
to obtain copyright ownership. 252
Works created in one's employment are clearly works made for
hire, but what of specially commissioned works? For example, the
museum may hire a public relations firm to develop certain promo-
tional materials for its various activities. These specially commissioned
works look like works made for hire, and under the 1909 Act, it was
generally presumed that they were.253 The current Act, however, has
owner of copyright for plans, rather than contractor, court said that although contractor could
direct the result that the architect was to accomplish, it could not direct the means, which the
architect as a trained professional, was required to use). The work for hire doctrine has been held
applicable to a volunteer, who prepared a manual for a town and then tried to claim the
copyright. The court held that the crucial factor for purpose of the copyright laws was whether
the town had the right to direct and supervise the manner in which the employee [volunteer] did
his work. Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
249. See, e.g., Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972) (where copyright in song, "Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf,"
claimed by adaptor, the court found that the composition was motivated by Walt Disney (who
had control of the original work) and adaptor's supervisor, Irving Berlin, and therefore was a
work done for hire); Siegel v. Nat'l Periodical Publisher, 508 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1967) (work made
for hire not applicable to Superman, as it was developed before the employment relationship
began); Excel Promotions Corp. v. Babylon Beacon, Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. 616 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
(copyright in advertisements prepared by employees of a newspaper for a firm advertising in the
paper held to be owned by the firm as it was at their insistence and expense that the work was
done).
250.
The presumption that initial ownership rights vest in the employer for hire is well
established in American copyright law . ...
H.R. Report at 121.
251. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
252. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.
1955) (where lyrics were written on a special job assignment and writer later assigned his
copyright to the company which hired him).
253. See, e.g., Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972); Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d
565 (2d Cir. 1966); Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939). Some problems
may be raised regarding commissioned works created after the enactment of the .1967 Act but
prior to its effective date of January 1, 1978. Which act should apply: the 1909 Act under which
the employer is deemed the author, or the 1976 Act which would award copyright to the artist if
the work does not fall within the specified categories or the requirement of writing is not met?
See Beckett, The Copyright Act of 1976: When Is It Effective, 24 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 391, 398
(1977).
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now reversed the presumption and has explicitly set forth nine circum-
stances where a commissioned work becomes a work made for hire,
but only if the parties expressly agree in writing to create a work made
for hire.254 These nine circumstances are: as a contribution to a collec-
tive work, as part of a motion picture or other audio-visual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instruc-
tional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas.
255
Thus, if the museum commissions a work which does not fall into one
of these categories, it is not a work made for hire even if the parties
expressly agree in writing that it is. For example, the scholarly essays
would likely be regarded as works made for hire because they fit into
one of the nine enumerated categories as contributions to a collective
work. Alternatively, the commissioned dance program does not fall
within any of the nine categories and cannot be made a work made
for hire. The museum, to become owner of the copyright, must obtain
an assignment by written agreement. The rules relating to works
made for hire illustrate how the current Copyright Act makes it
difficult for the author to be dispossessed of ownership rights in his
copyright. 256 As a result, the museum, when commissioning a work,
should obtain an assignment of the copyright if there is any doubt
about the status of the piece as a work made for hire.
254.
[A] work specially ordered or commissioned for use. ... if the parties expressly agree
in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made
for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). As stated in the House Report,
The basic problem is how to draw a statutory line beween those works written on
special order or commission that should be considered as "works made for hire," and
those that should not. The definition now provided by the bill represents a compro-
mise which, in effect, spells out those specific categories of commissioned works that
can be considered "works made for hire" under certain circumstances.
at 121. For works denied classification as "works made for hire" because they fell outside one of
the nine specified categories, see, e.g., Aitken v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb.
1982) (architectural plans); Mister B Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (fabric design); May v. Morganelli-Heumann and Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363 (9th
Cir. 1980) (architectural drawings).
For denial of commissioned photographs of status as "work made for hire" because of lack of
written instrument, see Childers v. High Society Magazine, 557 F. Supp. 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
255. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
256. At least, the right to terminate transfer at the appropriate time. There is evidence,
however, that publishers still use "work made for hire" contracts with free lance artists by means
of the categories "contributions to collective works" and "supplementary works." See Comment,
Free Lance Artists, Works for Hire, and the Copyright Act of 1976, 15 U.C.D. L. Rev. 703, 714
(1982).
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9.6 Collective Works
From time to time a museum may solicit contributions from a
number of sources and assemble them into a collective whole, such as
an anthology, periodical issue, or exhibition catalogue. These works,
known as collective works, 57 are a form of derivative work. The
ownership of the copyright on the individual contributions to a collec-
tive work remains with the individual author and is not a work made
for hire unless the parties expressly agree in writing. 258
What if a contributor to the photo-realist catalogue refuses to con-
fer a work made for hire status on his individual contribution? The
museum still remains the creator of a collective work and, as a collec-
tive work owner, has the right to reproduce and distribute the individ-
ual contribution as part of the current collective work, a revised
edition, or in another collective work in the same series. But the
museum cannot reproduce and distribute reprints of the individual
contribution without the consent of the author. 259 The museum should
resolve ownership rights at the outset when forming a collective work
by either creating a work made for hire, obtaining copyright owner-
ship, or obtaining an exclusive or non-exclusive license to make re-
prints of the individual contribution.
9.7 The Pushman Doctrine
We have already emphasized the fundamental principle in copy-
right law of the distinction between ownership of the material object
and ownership of the copyright.26 0 An outright sale of the material
object such as a book, canvas, or master tape-recording of a musical
work does not transfer copyright. One possible exception to the above
principle that applies to certain works transferred before 1978 is a
257.
A "collective work" is a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia,
in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in
themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
258.
Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from copyright
in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of the contribution.
In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the
owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the
privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular
collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in
the same series.
17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1982). For legislative history of this section, see H.R. Report at 122.
259. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1982).
260. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
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situation which involves the transfer of an unpublished work of art,
one which has not yet acquired federal statutory copyright. Under the
Pushman Doctrine, named after a case arising in New York State,
2 61
an artist was presumed to have transferred common law copyright at
the time the original work of art was sold unless the artist specifically
reserved copyright ownership.2 62 The new law has clearly overruled
the Pushman Doctrine, 26 3 and even before the current Act became
effective, two important states in the art world, California and New
York, enacted statutes reversing the presumption that an uncondi-
tional sale of an unpublished work of art transferred copyright along
with the material object. 26 4
10. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Having discussed various aspects of copyrightable subject matter
and ownership, we now turn directly to what constitutes the illegal
use of a copyrighted work. Infringement of copyright is defined as the
violation of any one of the exclusive rights. 26 5 Other than the distribu-
tion right, the rights of reproduction, adaptation, performance and
display involve, in different ways, the copyright owner's authority to
prevent others from copying his work without consent. In essence, to
prove copyright infringement one must show that another has actually
copied from the work266 and that he has copied a material amount of
261. Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y, 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E. 2d 249 (1942).
262.
[A]n artist must, if he wishes to retain or protect the reproduction right, make some
reservation of that right when he sells the painting.
Id. at 308, 39 N.E. 2d at 251.
263. See H.R. Report at 124, stating that the presumption of transfer is reversed under the
new Act.
264. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 223-24 (McKinney 1968); Cal. Civ. Code § 982(c) (West Supp.
1976).
265. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982).
266. In the absence of direct proof of copying, which is extremely difficult to obtain, infringe-
ment may be proved by showing that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that
there is substantial similarity between them. Sid and Marty Krofft Television Prods. Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Access is proven when the plaintiff
shows that the defendant had an opportunity to view or copy the plaintiff's work"); Novelty
Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1977) (defendant's designers
actually viewed the upholstery fabric design of the plaintiff); Universal City Studios v. Kamar
Industries, 217 U.S.P.Q. 1162 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (defendant's products were based on character,
E.T., movie had been released prior to manufacture of products and defendant held to have
access); Jack Lenor Larsen v. Dakotah, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendant saw
photographs of plaintiff's fabric designs in a department store); Jason v. Fonda, 698 F.2d 966
(9th Cir. 1982) (bare possibility of access is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
where plaintiff alleged that the movie "Coming Home," had been based on her privately printed
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the work. 267 Alternatively, copyright infringement does not occur
when a third party has independently duplicated the work. 268 The
classic example of this principle involves a photographer who has
taken a picture of the same scene and from the same point of view as
in a prior copyrighted photograph. His independent, although identi-
cal creation, is not copyright infringement.
Although the principle of independent creation limits the scope of
copyright protection, other principles broaden its scope. In this re-
gard, innocent or unintentional copying is no defense to copyright
infringement. 26 9 For example, if someone on the museum staff copied
from a book thought to be in the public domain, infringement will
have occurred. The intent of the infringer might carry some weight as
to the scope of recovery and the extent of damages, but not in estab-
lishing infringement.
Also broadening the scope of infringement is the principle that
infringement of copyright encompasses acts other than verbatim or
literal copying. To constitute infringement, the amount copied must
be substantial 27 0 and material when compared to the copyrighted
work as a whole, but copyright infringement will include such acts
book which was sold in Southern California.) The copying may be done subconsciously and not
deliberately, and still be infringement. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420
F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (George Harrison's "My Sweet Lord" held an infringement of
"He's So Fine.")
267. The more striking the similarity is, the less likely that the work was independently
duplicated. Boorstvn, supra note 23 at 290.
268. "Absent copying there can be no infringement of copyright." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201 (1954) at 218 (footnote omitted). See also Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian,
446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971) (In this case both plaintiff and defendant made jeweled bees. Court
stated that there was evidence that defendant, who had designed other jeweled pins in the form
of living creatures, had independently created his bee); Franklin Mint Corp. v. Nat'l Wildlife
Art Exch. 575 F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir. 1978) ("Since copyrights do not protect thematic c3ncepts, the
fact that the same subject matter may be present in two paintings does not prove copying or
infringement"). Moreover, in this case, the artist, who had painted both works which were the
subject of controversy, painted a third picture on the same theme "while in the courtroom and
without referring to either of his earlier paintings" Id. at 66. The court held that each painting
was a separate artistic effort.
269. See supra note 187. One may also be held liable on the theory of contributory infringe-
ment when "one who, with the knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materi-
ally contributes to the infringing conduct of another." Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia
Artist Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Original Appalachian
Artworks v. Cradle Creations, 684 F.2d 821 (1lth Cir. 1982) (pattern book for making dolls that
were substantially similar to plaintiffs copyrighted dolls held to constitute contributor infringe-
ment).
270. Nimmer has devised two basic forms of "substantial similarity," comprehensive nonli-
teral similarity, where the essence or structure of one work is copied by another, and fragmented
1984] COPYRIGHT AND THE ART MUSEUM
transcending verbatim similarity such as paraphrasing,
271 or taking
the general pattern of a work.2 12 Regardless of what kind of copying
has occurred, the question to be decided in every case of copyright
infringement is whether the copy comes so near the original as to give
the impression created by the original. As long as the ordinary ob-
server 2 73 would recognize the copy as having been taken from the
original, it does not matter whether the copying is verbatim, a para-
phrase, or the taking of the general pattern of the work.
Copyright infringement actions, 274 which can involve great time
and expense, should not be brought unless the matter is a serious
instance of infringement and the parties cannot work out a settlement.
For the copyright owner who has won an infringement action, the
damages can be substantial. A prevailing plaintiff in an infringement
literal similarity where there has been verbatim copying of a small amount of 
the original work.
These two forms present very different problems for the courts: for the first, to 
determine when
the line between idea and expression has been crossed and for the latter, to 
determine at which
point the amount copied becomes substantial. 3 Nimmer § 13.03[A].
271. See, e.g., Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, 378 F. Supp. 686 
(S.D.N.Y.
1974), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir. 1974) (infringing psychology textbook was in large portion 
a
recognizable paraphrase of an earlier work).
272. The principle that the "pattern" of a work is protected was first expressed 
by Z. Chaffee
in Reflections on Copyright Law, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 503 (1945).
I like to say that the protection covers the "pattern" of the work.. . For example, 
the
idea of Irish-Jewish Ingh-Jewish marriage in a play may be borrowed. With 
this
theme, some resemblance in characters and situations is inevitable, but the 
line of
infringement may not yet be crossed. On the other hand, the pattern of the play-the
sequence of events and the development of the interplay of the characters-must 
not
be followed scene by scene. Such a correspondence of pattern would be an infringe-
ment although every word of the spoken dialogue was changed.
Id. at 511 (footnote omitted).
273. The determination of substantial similarity is thus to be made by the impression 
upon the
ordinary observer or audience.
[T]he ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities [in the two fabric
designs in question] would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic
appeal as the same.
Peter Pan Fabrics Corp. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960). See cases cited in
3 Nimmer § 13.03[E] at 13-40, note 92 and subsequent criticism. One result of this test is 
that
expert testimony on the question of similarity has been held irrelevant. Arnstein 
v. Porter, 154
F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 230 U.S. 851 (1947).
274. A discussion of criminal prosecution for copyright infringement, as provided 
for in § 506
of the Act, is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Lindenberg-Woods, 
The Smoking
Revolver: Criminal Copyright Infringement, 27 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 63 (1979); and, Com-
ment, Criminal Copyright Infringement and Step Beyond: 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1976), 60 Neb. L.
Rev. 114 (1981).
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action can obtain both actual damages as a result of the infringement
and the defendant's profits.2 75 In lieu of these remedies, the Copyright
Act provides for statutory damages which are based on set amounts
per infringement at the court's discretion.276 In addition, the prevail-
ing plaintiff can obtain injunctive relief277 and in appropriate circum-
stances can have the infringing articles impounded or destroyed.278
275.
The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her
as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to
the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. In
establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof
only of the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or herdeductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1982).
276.
(1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner may elect,
at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages
and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the
action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individu-
ally, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum
of not less than $250 or more than $10,000 as the court considers just. For the purposes
of this subsection, all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitute one
work.
(2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court
finds, that the infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion mayincrease the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $50,000. In a case
where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that suchinfringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statu-
tory damages to a sum of not less than $100 ....
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1982).
277.
Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may . . . grant
temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or
restrain infringement of a copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1982).
See, e.g., Brennan v. Hearst Corp., Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,295 (1981) (defendant
enjoined from distributing book which contained picture substantially similar to plaintiffs
copyrighted drawing of grapes and leaves).
278.
(a) At any time while an action under this title is pending, the court may order theimpounding, on such terms as it may deem reasonable, of all copies or phonorecords
claimed to have been made or used in violation of the copyright owner's exclusive
rights, and of all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other
articles by means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced.(b) As part of a final judgment or decree, the court may order the destruction or other
reasonable disposition of all copies or phonorecords found to have been made or used
in violation of the copyright owner's exclusive rights, and of all plates, molds, matri-
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Finally, costs and attorney's fees can be given to the prevailing party
at the court's discretion.
279
11. FAIR USE
The major defense 280 to an action of copyright infringement is the
defense of fair use. 28' This equitable doctrine creates a privilege to use
another's work in a reasonable manner even though the use might
technically constitute an infringement. Fair use is not easily defined,
but the current Act has set forth basic guidelines or factors to be
considered in determining fair use. These are the purpose and charac-
ter of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for non-profit educational purposes; 282 the nature of the copyrighted
work; 28 3 the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the work as a whole;284 and the effect of the use on the potential
ces, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by means of which such copies or
phonorecords may be reproduced.
17 U.S.C. § 503 (1976). For a description of the historical development of these provisions and
their interpretation by the courts, see Alexander, Discretionary Power to Impound and Destroy
Infringing Articles: An Historical Perspective, 29 J. Copyright Soc'y 479 (1982).
279. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976).
280. Other defenses include forfeiture of copyright, nonoriginality, lack of copyrightable
subject matter, abandonment of copyright, de minimis use and the first amendment. See
generally Leavens, In Defense of Unauthorized Use: Recent Developments in Defending Copy-
right Infringement, 44 Law & Contemp. Probs. 3 (1981).
281. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). This is the first statutory recognition of a judicially created
doctrine, "one of the most important and well-established limitations on the exclusive right of
copyright owners .... " H.R. Report at 65.
See generally Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, Study No. 14, 2 Studies in Copyright
(Arthur Fisher Mem. Ed. 1963); Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright: The 'Exclusive
Rights' Tensions in The New Copyright Act, 24 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 215 (1977); and Schulman,
Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act, 53 Iowa L. Rev. 832 (1968); Perlman and
Rhinelander, Williams Wilkins Co. v. United States: Photocopying, Copyright and the Judicial
Process, The Sup. Ct. Rev. 355 (1975).
282. See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d
1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that "any commercial use tends to cut against a fair use
defense,").
283.
[I]t seems clear that the scope of the fair use doctrine should be considerably narrower
in the case of newsletters than in that of either mass-circulation periodicals or scientific
journals.
H.R. Report at 73.
284. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prod. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (defendants claimed that their parody of Disney characters was protected
by fair use; the court held that by copying the images in their entirety, the defendants' excessive
copying precluded fair use); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554, 560
(D.C.D.C. 1981) ("The admitted reprinting of approximately 92% of plaintiffs story precludes
the fair use defense...").
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market for the work. 2 5 The Copyright Act does not indicate what
particular weight is to be given to these factors, nor does it indicate
how the factors interrelate. 2 6 But perhaps the most important of the
factors is the last, 8 7 that is, does the new work compete with and
supplant the need for the original? If so, chances are that fair use has
not occurred.
In general, fair use occurs when one is using another's work in the
context or a new work, usually for purposes of criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research.28 8 Examples are a
photograph of a painting in the review of a museum exhibition; a
quotation in a scholarly work or for purposes of review and criti-
cism; 2 80 incidental reproduction in a newscast; 290 summary or quota-
285. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978); (in case brought by sons of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg against Louis Nizer, author of
book on the trial of the Rosenbergs, Nizer claimed his incorporation of copyrighted letters in the
book constituted fair use. The court held that the effect of the use of the letters on their future
market was a matter for trial); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 503 F. Supp.
1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying concept of effect on the market to a derivative work; Iowa State
Univ. Research Found. v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The fair use
doctrine is not a 'license for corporate theft' ").
286. According to the drafters of the Act, these are not exact rules, but guidelines, and the
courts must be free to make decisions on a case-by-case basis. H.R. Report at 66. However, in the
area of classroom use, more specific provisions were incorporated in the House Report. These are
Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions and Guidelines for
Educational Uses of Music. They were agreed to by interested organizations and were included
in the House Report as "reasonable interpretations of the minimum standards of fair use." H.R.
Report at 72. See Hayes, Classroom Fair Use: A Reevaluation, 26 Bull. Copyright Soc'y 101
(1978). The controversy over classroom photocopying was recently publicized when a group of
publishers sued New York University, several individual faculty members and a private photo-
copying facility used by them for copyright infringement. (Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v.
New York University). Although the matter reached a settlement, the president of the Associa-
tion of American Publishers stated:
• ..we wish to make clear that the publishing community does not consider the
overall issue of college and university photocopying has been fully resolved.
We and our members will actively pursue further arrangements [such as those agreed
to in the settlement] at other campuses and related copying facilities.
26 Pat., Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 145 (1983).
287. See 3 Nimmer, § 13.05[A](4) and § 13.05[B] for an analysis of this factor in terms of the
function of each work.
288. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
289. In this situation, the functional differences are distinctive. One would not read quota-
tions in a review rather than see a play, or look at a photograph of a painting rather than viewing
the original in the museum.
290. See, e.g., Italian Book Corp. v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 458 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Pac. and S. Co. v. Carol Duncan, Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,421 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
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tions in an address or news article; 211 use in parody or burlesque. 292
Other typical examples where fair use might arise in the museum
context are reproduction of works of art for documentary files, to
accompany a notice that a work has been removed from its usual
location in the museum, or as small illustrations on gallery guides.
What is usually precluded from fair use is wholesale and systematic
copying. 29 3
Because of its inherent vagueness, the doctrine of fair use should not
be abused by the museum trying to justify a wide variety of copying.
A more solid justification is to be found under the exceptions to the
exclusive rights, which are much more concrete than fair use and will
form a more predictable basis in determining the allowable use of a
copyrighted work.
291. See, e.g., Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.C. 1980) (16-word quota-
tion not infringement). But cf. Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 557 F. Supp. 1067
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (extensive quotations of material from soon-to-be published Gerald Ford mem-
oirs not protected by fair use).
292. The defense of fair use as applied to works of parody and satire has been raised in many
infringement actions, e.g., Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.
Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (holding that comedian Jack Benny's parody "Auto-
light" of the movie "Gaslight" was not entitled to fair use defense); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air
Pirates, 591 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (limiting holding in
Gaslight case); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that Saturday Night Live's "I Love Sodom" a fair use of "I Love New York"). Issues
raised by parody fair use include the benefits of parody (e.g., social criticism), the weight to be
given to the amount taken from the original work and the effect of marketability on the original.
See, Light, Parody, Burlesque and the Economic Rationale for Copyright, 11 Conn. L. Rev. 615
(1979); Comment, Piracy or Parody: Never the Twain, 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. 550 (1966);
Comment, Parody and Fair Use: The Critical Question, 57 Wash. L. Rev. 163 (1981). While
pictorial works may be less susceptible to parody than literary or musical ones, paintings such as
Grant Wood's "American Gothic" have formed the basis of many a cartoon.
293. It is important to emphasize that this is the case even if theuse is for a non-profit,
eductional purpose. Museums should not be indifferent to infringing practices on the grounds
that they are non-profit institutions acting for the public good. See, e.g., Wihtol v. Crow, 309
F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962) (church choir director who made musical arrangement of copyrighted
hymn held infringer); Encyclopaedia Brittanica Education Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243
(W.D.N.Y. 1978) (taping of plaintiff's entire copyrighted films for showing in schools too
excessive for fair use defense); Marcus v. Rowley, 217 U.S.P.Q. 691 (9th Cir. 1983) (booklet on
cake decorating prepared for public classroom use held to infringe similar booklet when majority
of pages were copied verbatim and no attempt made to obtain copyright permission or credit
plaintiff for the use of her material. The court refused to apply the defense of fair use because of
the wholesale copying, in spite of the fact that the plaintiff suffered no monetary loss and the
defendant showed no profit). But cf. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345
(Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
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12. CONCLUSION
Copyright law, by its nature sets up a tension between creators and
disseminators of works of art. The art museum embodies this conflict.
As disseminator, the art museum is the best vehicle by which the
public has access to, and may learn about works of art. As creator, it
has monetary and aesthetic interests in protecting its own copyright-
able works.
The administrator and his counsel should be conscious of the muse-
um's delicate position as creator and user. Awareness of copyright law
and its underlying policies will allow them to obtain the information
necessary to employ staff time efficiently, to avoid legal complica-
tions, and to make the economic decisions most beneficial to the
museum.
